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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Problem Statement 
A producers cooperative association is an organization of firms 
each of which contributes some of its resources to a jointly-owned 
enterprise, or cooperative, which processes and markets output of member 
patrons or supplies them with inputs which they use in production. In 
addition, a cooperative may process and market output of nonmember 
patrons or supply them with inputs which they use in production. 
In analyzing the cooperative association, it is necessary to dis­
tinguish between the cooperative association and the economic entities 
of which it is composed. The cooperative association consists of its 
member firms, including both the resources which they individually own 
and control and those resources which they jointly own and which are con­
trolled by the cooperative. The cooperative consists of these jointly-
owned resources. With respect to the member firms, there is a distinc­
tion between ownership and control. Each firm consists of the resources 
which it individually owns and controls and a share of those which it 
jointly owns with the other member firms and which are controlled by the 
cooperative. 
The organizational structure of the cooperative association and its 
member firms is illustrated in Figure 1.1. Each of the wedges represents 
a member firm while uhs area within the circle represents the coopera­
tive. The resources of a member firm which are jointly held and con­
trolled are represented by that portion of the corresponding wedge within 
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Figure 1.1. The cooperative association (adapted from Phillips 
[44, Fig. 1, p. 76]). 
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the circle, such as abc. That portion outside the circle, such as area 
bdec, represents those resources of the member firm which are outside 
the cooperative and which are individually controlled. The size of the 
member firm is represented by the size of the corresponding wedge. The 
extent of its patronage with the cooperative is represented by the 
wedge's width. As the figure indicates, there is no relationship between 
member firm size and patronage. However, as the figure does indicate, 
the contribution of resources to the cooperative is, at least ideally, 
in proportion to patronage. The extent to which this relationship exists 
in reality is due largely to the fact that much of the capital of the 
cooperative is gathered from patronage refunds and per-unit capital 
investments. 
Within the cooperative association, there are not one, but many 
decision-making units. The entrepreneur or decision-maker for each 
member firm must make decisions concerning which products the firm will 
produce, how much of each of these products it will produce, what produc­
tion methods it will use, and the quantity of each of the factors of 
production it will need. Just as the decision-maker of each of the 
member firms must make decisions concerning its operation, a decision­
maker for the cooperative must make decisions concerning the operation of 
the cooperative. 
This decision-maker may be the manager of the cooperative or the 
cooperative's board of directors. It may also be a group of member firms 
or the cooperative association as a whole. The purpose of this study is 
not to identify the individual or individuals who make the decisions for 
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the cooperative. Therefore, throughout this study, the identity of the 
cooperative decision-maker is left unspecified. Instead, it is only 
assumed that there is a cooperative decision-maker who makes decisions 
for the cooperative according to a cooperative objective function, just 
as the decision-makers for the member firms make decisions for these firms 
according to their objective functions. 
Some of the decisions which must be made by the cooperative decision­
maker are of a long-run nature. These include decisions on investment 
and financing and are beyond the scope of this study. This study is only 
concerned with the decisions which must be made by the cooperative 
decision-maker in the short-run, the period of time in which the resources 
of the cooperative are fixed. As it is, there are a number of decisions 
involving the operation of the cooperative in the short-run which must be 
made by the cooperative decision-maker. There are also a number of 
problems and issues concerning these decisions. 
One of these problems is that of identifying the cooperative's 
objective or objectives. An objective is necessary if the cooperative 
decision-maker is to operate the cooperative in a rational manner. 
Several possible objectives have been suggested in the literature on 
cooperative associations, but there appears to be no agreement on what 
the objective or objectives of the cooperative are. There is soîse agree­
ment that the purpose of the cooperative is to benefit its members. If 
the cooperative decision-maker attempts to benefit the members of the 
cooperative association, the objective or objectives of the cooperative 
cannot be independent of the objectives of the member firms and the 
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welfare of the members must be an argument in the cooperative objective 
function. The proprietary firm is generally not considered to be 
interested in how its actions affect the ability of those with whom it 
trades to achieve their objectives. On the other hand, a cooperative 
decision-maker who attempts to benefit the cooperative association's 
member firms must be concerned with how the cooperative's actions affect 
the ability of the member firms to achieve their objectives. 
It is not always clear, however, what is meant by a cooperative 
"benefitting its members." If a decision made by a cooperative decision­
maker results in an increase in the value of the objective function of 
each and every one of the cooperative association's member firms, the 
action can probably be said to benefit the member firms. However, a 
decision made by the cooperative decision-maker may make some members 
better off while making others worse off. Similarly, a decision made by 
the cooperative decision-maker may attract new members to the coopera­
tive association, but make some existing members worse off. Thus, 
selection of a cooperative objective function involves making decisions 
concerning the distribution of benefits among members and between exist­
ing and potential members. 
Assuming that the cooperative decision-maker is successful in defin­
ing the objective or objectives of the cooperative, he must be able to 
make decisions which will result in an efficient operation of the coopera­
tive. In other words, he must make decisions which will result in the 
maximum value of the cooperative objective function. To do this, the 
cooperative decision-maker must determine which variables can be used as 
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instruments in achieving the coopérative's objective or objectives. The 
cooperative decision-maker's choice of instruments depends upon what the 
cooperative's objective or objectives are. The choice may also depend 
upon the cooperative's operating principles. For example, for a supply 
cooperative, the use of prices as instruments may be greatly limited if 
the cooperative decision-maker feels the cooperative must supply all of 
its goods and services to members at cost. 
Among the decisions which the cooperative decision-maker must make, 
are a number of production and pricing decisions. The cooperative 
decision-maker must determine which goods and services the cooperative 
will supply its member firms. He must determine how much of each of 
these products it will produce, what production processes it will use, 
and the quantity of each of the factors of production it will require. 
If the cooperative consists of more than one plant, the cooperative 
decision-maker must make these decisions for each of the plants. In 
addition, he must determine the prices the cooperative will charge mem­
bers for the goods and services it supplies thezi and thz prices it vill 
offer them for the goods they market through it. 
Some of these production and pricing decisions may involve goods and 
services which are public goods or which are characterized by externali­
ties. Within the cooperative association, a public good is a good or 
service provided by the cooperative which benefits all member firms in 
such a manner that the benefits received by one member firm do not 
diminish those received by any other. There are two types of public 
goods which may be provided by the cooperative. There are those which 
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affect production, and there are those which affect price. The former 
include research and development and the dissemination of production 
information. The latter include bargaining services and advertising. 
Within the cooperative association, an externality is a benefit or spill­
over to one member firm resulting from the use or production of a good or 
service by another. Disease control is an example of a good which is 
characterized by externalities. 
Because public goods and externalities are typically associated 
with market failures, production of them by the cooperative may require 
special attention in the decision-making process. Also, because the 
cooperative may not be able to exclude nonmembers from the benefits of 
public goods paid for by members of the cooperative association, members 
may have an incentive to become nonmembers. Therefore, the cooperative 
decision-maker may have to act to combat problems which result from free-
riding. 
Closely related to the decisions which the cooperative decision­
maker must make on prices are the decisions he must make concerning the 
determination of patronage refunds and the allocation of joint fixed 
costs among goods and services. Because the cooperative cannot determine 
the actual costs of producing the products it sells to its patrons at the 
time of sale, it charges its patrons a cash price for each product at the 
time of sale. Then after the costs are determined, the cooperative will 
grant its patrons patronage refunds. 
The decisions on patronage refunds are linked to those on prices. A 
high cash price may discourage sales but will ensure the cooperative's 
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ability to grant patronage refunds later. Thus, the cooperative decision­
maker must decide on low prices or large patronage refunds. His decision 
may be influenced by tax considerations or by the fact that deferred 
patronage refunds proviae the cooperative a useful source of capital. 
One method which can be used by the cooperative in determining the 
per-unit patronage refund for a particular good or service consists of 
subtracting the average variable cost of providing the good or service 
and the average fixed cost allocated to it from its cash price. In this 
case, the method the cooperative uses to allocate joint fixed costs, as 
well as the method it uses to determine patronage refunds, becomes a 
factor in determining the effective prices which, in turn, affect the 
production decisions of the member patrons and, consequently, their 
welfare. 
More often, related goods or services are grouped together in 
departments and a single per-unit patronage refund is determined for each 
department. Even in this case, it may be necessary to allocate joint 
fixed costs among the departments. If this is so, the cost allocations 
will still affect the determination of patronage refunds and, thus, the 
effective prices. 
In the extreme, a cooperative may determine a single per-unit patron­
age refund for all of the goods and services which it sells. Both this 
and the case in which more than one product is included in a department 
have the potential for allowing the "netting" of losses in one line of 
products against the gains of others. This is in direct conflict with 
one of the "principles of cooperation." 
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The "principles of cooperation" are a set of fundamental principles 
to which most of those involved in the cooperative movement subscribe and 
by which they feel cooperatives should be run. There is no one exact set 
of these principles - numerous authors have offered theirs. (For example, 
see [1, pp. 47-70; 2, pp. 183-203; 7, p. 81; and 47, pp. 201-212].) How­
ever, certain of these principles have gained the acceptance of a major­
ity of cooperators, and the principle of "service at cost" is one of 
these. 
In actual practice, many cooperatives choose to ignore one or more 
of these principles. Although some of these principles have been incor­
porated into law, in many cases, the cooperative decision-maker may be in 
the situation where he must decide between operating in accordance to a 
particular principle or not. At least, he may be interested to know how 
practicing these principles affects his operation in terms of cost or 
efficiency. 
Strict adherence to the principle of service at cost may restrict 
the ability of the multi-product cooperative to achieve its objectives. 
Proprietary firms that compete with cooperatives may often use loss-
leaders in attracting business. A loss-leader is a product for which the 
price charged is lower than the average cost of providing the product. 
Although when taken by itself, the loss-leader may be a money-loser, it 
may actually be a money-maker when its complementary relationships with 
other products are taken into account. This is because sales of a loss-
leader may increase the volumes of other products to such an extent that 
the firm's level of profits is higher than it would be if the price of 
the loss-leader were high enough to make it self-supporting. 
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It is possible that, in a similar manner, the cooperative may be able 
to further its own objectives through the proper use of loss-leaders. 
Thus, strict adherence to the principle of providing service at cost is 
at issue, and the cooperative decision-maker must decide if the coopera­
tive will carry loss-leaders or if it will practice a policy of providing 
service at cost with each product line entirely supporting itself. If 
the cooperative decision-maker adopts a policy of loss-leaders, he must 
be able to determine which products the cooperative will carry as loss-
leaders and what prices it will charge for them. 
Other decisions and issues which concern the cooperative involve its 
relationship with nonmembers. The cooperative decision-maker must 
determine the extent to which the cooperative will do business with non-
members and under what conditions business with nonmembers will be trans­
acted. Nonmember purchases of supplies and services from the cooperative 
may be encouraged if they allow the cooperative to expand its volume to 
such an extent that the per-unit cost of providing goods and services to 
the member firms decreases. Likewise, marketing of nonmember products 
through the cooperative may be desirable if the increased supply of 
products under management of the cooperative results in a decrease in the 
per-unit cost of handling or processing the members' products or an in­
crease in the bargaining power of the cooperative and, consequently, the 
prices it receives. 
On the other hand, there may exist reasons for limiting the business 
between nonmembers and the cooperative. The extent to which the coopera­
tive can do business with nonmembers may be restricted by law, or the 
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cooperative may be prohibited by principle from doing any business what­
soever with nonmembers. (Abrahamsen [l, pp. 64-65], for example, dis­
cusses the principle of "exclusive trading with members.") 
If the cooperative does have nonmember patrons, the cooperative 
decision-maker must decide whether or not to grant them patronage refunds 
on a par with member patrons. There may be a limited tax advantage to 
the cooperative from doing so. On the other hand, retention of the net 
savings from nonmember business may provide an important source of capi­
tal for the cooperative. 
Finally, the cooperative decision-maker must determine the coopera­
tive's membership policy. Again, the cooperative may be forced to prac­
tice an open membership policy. (The principle of "open membership" is 
included or discussed in [l, pp. 63-64; 7, p. 18% and 47, pp. 201-202].) 
In other cases the cooperative decision-maker may choose to pursue an 
open membership policy for entirely economic reasons. An expansion of 
membership may increase the cooperative's bargaining power or may allow 
it to more economically serve its existing members. Also, if activities 
of the cooperative benefit nonmembers in such a way that there is incen­
tive for members to become nonmembers, the cooperative may have to take 
steps which will encourage membership simply to keep from losing existing 
members. On the other hand, the cooperative decision-maker may choose 
to pursue a restricted membership policy because an expansion of member­
ship may make its existing members worse off. 
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Review of the Literature^ 
In the early literature on cooperative associations, there was no 
mention of a cooperative decision-ssker. Instead, the efforts of the 
early writers on cooperative associations were focused upon the entrepre­
neurs of the individual member firms as they were seen to be the only 
decision-makers within the cooperative association, utilizing the 
resources within their individual plants and those of the cooperative to 
maximize their individual profits. 
The work of Emelianoff [18], has been regarded by many as one of the 
first important attempts at objectively analyzing the cooperative associ­
ation. Emelianoff viewed the cooperative association as an organization 
of economic units, each maintaining its economic independence, but con­
ducting and coordinating their business activities through an agency, 
owned and controlled by them. He stressed that the cooperative was only 
an extension of its member firms and that it was not an "enterprise," 
defined by Emelianoff as a profit-acquiring economic unit. Consequently, 
because of the absence of profit rewards, the existence of a cooperative 
entrepreneur or decision-maker could not be assumed. 
^This review of literature does not include a vein of literature on 
cooperatives which has appeared for the most part in the American 
Economic Review [16, 23, 38, and 53]. McGregor [38] calls the subject of 
these articles "production cooperatives" and distinguishes them from what 
he calls "marketing cooperatives." According to him, marketing coopera­
tives may be involved in production in the sense that tliey process the 
products of their members, but members perform their producer role out­
side the cooperative in contrast to the production cooperative. Most of 
the models reviewed in this section are marketing cooperatives, to use 
McGregor's terminology. In the extreme, however, production coopera­
tives can be viewed as a special case of the marketing cooperative in 
which the cooperative purchases its members' labor and "processes" it 
by converting it into a finished product which it sells. 
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This concept of a cooperative association was shared by others, 
including Robotka [45] and Phillips [44, pp. 74-75], who stated that 
"the cooperative has no more economic life or purpose apart from that 
of the participating economic units than one of the individual plants of 
a large multi-plant firm." Phillips accepted Emelianoff's idea of a 
cooperative association as an organization of economic units, each main­
taining its economic independence in seeking profits. The cooperative 
was not seen as a decision-making unit, but as a simple extension of the 
member firms which are the decision-making units. 
In the Phillips model, the cooperating firms individually attempt to 
maximize their profits, and each is treated as a multi-plant, vertically 
integrated firm. The output of the joint plant or cooperative is assumed 
to be the raw product input of the individual plants of the member firms 
or, alternatively, the output of the individual plants is assumed to be 
the raw product input of the cooperative. 
As a multi-plant firm, each cooperating firm must make decisions 
concerning the allocation of its productive resources between the cooper­
ative and its individual plant or plants. Within this framework, 
Phillips attempted to outline a set of rules for the optimum behavior of 
a member firm, given its objective of maximizing profits. According to 
Phillips, a member firm maximizes its profits by equating the sum of the 
marginal cost in its individual plant or plants and the marginal cost in 
the cooperative with the marginal revenue it receives from the market in 
which its output is sold. 
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The Phillips model was criticized by Aresvik [5], who argued that 
the marginal cost that a member firm incurs in the cooperative is not the 
marginal cost of the cooperative plant but the average cost of the plant. 
Aresvik also argued that the marginal revenue that a member firm receives 
from a marketing cooperative is not the marginal revenue received by the 
cooperative but the average revenue received by the cooperative. Thus, 
according to Aresvik, a member firm participating in a marketing coopera­
tive maximizes its profits by equating the sum of the marginal cost in 
its individual plant or plants and the average cost in the cooperative 
with the average revenue received by the cooperative in the market in 
which its output is sold. Aresvik did not, however, dispute Phillips' 
contention that it is the member firms and not the cooperative that are 
decision-makers. Instead, he stated that Phillips was correct in indi­
cating that the member units, not the cooperative, are the maximizing 
units. 
Trifon [5l] indicated that neither Phillips or Aresvik was correct. 
He suggested that in the example of a procurement or supply cooperative, 
each member patron maximizes its profits by equating the sum of the 
marginal cost in its individual plant and the marginal cost it incurs in 
the cooperative with the marginal revenue it receives from the market in 
which its output is sold. However; he argued that by increasing its 
patronage, an individual patron incurred oniy a portion of the additional 
cost to the cooperative while assuming a larger share of the initial 
costs. Thus, the marginal cost the member patron incurs in the coopera­
tive is neither the marginal or average cost curve of the cooperative. 
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He also suggested that as each individual member patron independently 
attempted to maximize its profits, there was no guarantee that an equilib­
rium would be reached. 
Because many of the early writers did not perceive the existence of 
a cooperative decision-maker, the objectives of the cooperative received 
little attention from them. Many of the early writers on cooperative 
associations agreed that the purpose of the cooperative was to benefit 
its members. According to Robotka [45, pp. 97-98], most American econo­
mists who had written on the subject of cooperative associations would 
have accepted the idea that cooperatives were operated for the benefit of 
their members as patrons. Stokdyk stated that members established 
cooperatives as a means of increasing the profits from their individual 
operations [included in 2, p. 69]. 
In the minds of many writers, the primary means by which this pur­
pose could be fulfilled was by the provision of services at cost. In 
fact, the concept of service at cost has been so widely accepted that it 
has been regarded, even now, as one of the "principles of cooperation" 
[1, pp. 54-56; 2, pp. 191-192; and 7, pp. 55-57]. According to Stokdyk 
[2, p. 69], the stated objective of most cooperatives was "to perform a 
given service or function at cost in order to increase the returns or 
profits of its members." 
Clark [ll] presented a model in which the cooperative attempted to 
minimize the cost of providing a given service to its member firms. In 
the Clark model, the cooperative either supplies goods and services to be 
used as inputs by the member firms, or markets their output. The 
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cooperative operates at the level which corresponds to the minimum 
average cost or the point at which average cost equals marginal cost. 
Aizsilnieks [3] criticized the model, arguing that the cooperative 
cannot have an independent or autonomous output policy because it must 
provide the quantity of services that the member firms demand. Thus, 
according to him, it is the cost curves of the individual member firms 
and not those of the cooperative which determine its output level. 
The belief, expressed by Aizsilnieks and other writers, that the 
cooperative passively meets the demands of the member firms and that no 
cooperative decision-maker exists was challenged by Savage [48] in a 
criticism of the Phillips model. Savage contended that even if the 
cooperative decision-maker does not seek profits for himself, he is 
capable of making entrepreneurial decisions that affect the environment 
of the cooperative's member firms. Savage argued that by reserving use 
of the term "firm" for describing economic units which seek profits, 
Phillips was ignoring the existence of cooperatives as "going concerns," 
as recognized by farmers and cooperative leaders. 
Enke [19] presented an early model of a consumer cooperative associ­
ation in which a decision-maker makes decisions concerning the operation 
of the cooperative. In his model, the pricing policies of the coopera­
tive are motivated by a cooperative objective function. According to 
Enke, an objective of maximizing the profit of the cooperative would take 
the members into account as owners only and would ignore them as patrons. 
Similarly, an objective of minimizing the prices charged members by the 
cooperative would take them into account as patrons but would ignore them 
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as owners. The alternative he suggested, maximization of the members' 
net consumer surplus, would consider the members as both owners and 
patrons. According to Enke, the decision-maker for a cooperative which 
has this objective should set the price the cooperative charges its 
member firms for a particular product equal to the marginal cost of pro­
ducing it. 
Helmberger and Hoos [28] presented the first model of a producer 
cooperative association in which the cooperative is a decision-making 
unit. They contended that the member firms of a cooperative association 
cannot be assumed to manage the cooperative as in the Phillips model. 
Instead, they felt that by joining a cooperative association, a member 
firm commits itself to abide by group decisions. Furthermore, by assum­
ing maximizing behavior on the part of the cooperative, they showed that 
behavioral relations and positions of equilibrium can be derived through 
marginal analysis. 
In their short-run model of a cooperative marketing association, the 
cooperative attempts to maximize the amount available for payment to its 
member firms for the raw material which they choose to supply the coopera­
tive. The cooperative combines productive services with the raw material 
to create a finished commodity which it markets. Treating the amount of 
the raw material supplied tc it by the member firms as a parameter beyond 
its control, the cooperative maximizes the price it is able to pay member 
firms for the raw material by equating the price of the finished commodi­
ty to the marginal cost of producing it. 
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According to Helmberger and Hoos, for any given level of raw material 
supplied to it by its member firms, there exists a unique maximum price 
that the cooperative is able to pay the member firms for the raw material. 
They called this relationship between the quantity of raw material sup­
plied to it and the maximum price the cooperative can pay its member 
firms for the raw material the short-run net returns function. 
Assuming that each member firm is a price-taker with respect to the 
price it receives from the cooperative for the raw material which it sup­
plies to the cooperative, Helmberger and Hoos also determined an aggre­
gate supply function for the member firms. The point at which this short-
run supply function and the short-run net returns function intersect 
determines the quantity of raw material the member firms supply the 
cooperative and the price the cooperative is able to pay them for it. 
Helmberger and Hoos demonstrated that their model is consistent with 
Aresvik's contention that a cooperating firm maximizes its profits by 
equating the sum of the marginal cost in its individual plant or plants 
and the average cost in the cooperative with the average revenue received 
by the cooperative in the market in which its output is sold. 
In addition to their short-run analysis, Helmberger and Hoos pre­
sented two long-run analyses of the cooperative association in which the 
assumption of fixed plant is dropped. In one analysis, the cooperative 
maximizes the price it pays the member firms subject to the constraint 
that all costs are met. After determining the supply of raw material 
which results in the maximum price, the cooperative maintains that price 
by pursuing a policy of restricted membership. In the other analysis. 
the cooperative pursues a policy of open membership and maximizes the 
price it pays its members for the raw material, subject to the constraint 
that the costs are met, for any amount of raw material which a freely 
variable number of member firms wishes to supply. 
Hardie [25] attempted to generalize the Helmberger and Hoos model of 
a marketing cooperative by constructing a model of a multi-product market­
ing cooperative. Unlike that of the Helmberger and Hoos model, the pro­
duction function of the cooperative in the Hardie model is assumed to be 
linear and homogeneous with discontinuous factor substitution so that the 
model can be expressed within a linear programming framework. The 
finished product prices are assumed to be fixed, and average variable 
costs are assumed to be constant. In addition, the raw materials are 
assumed to be supplied exclusively by member firms, and they are assumed 
to be the only limitational inputs. 
As in the Helmberger and Hoos model, the cooperative's demand for 
the raw materials produced by its member firms is a derived demand, 
resulting from the demand which it faces for the finished commodities. 
The cooperative is assumed to maximize the returns to the member-supplied 
products. In addition, it is assumed to distribute all of the net pro­
ceeds it receives from marketing the finished products to the member firms 
by granting each unit of a given product the same return. Unlike the 
cooperative in the Helmberger and Hoos m^del, the cooperative in the 
Hardie model must determine the division of the net proceeds among the 
different classes of member products since there are more than one. 
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Hardie suggested that distribution of the net proceeds within his 
model be carried out on the basis of shadow prices. If each member-
supplied raw material is paid its shadow price, the net proceeds are 
maximized and the cooperative distributes these proceeds to the member 
firms in such a manner that each unit of a given product receives the 
same return. In addition, shadow prices provide a criterion for the 
division of the net proceeds among the various classes of member 
products. 
As Hardie pointed out, when the raw materials are assigned prices 
equal to their shadow prices, the net revenue from any unit of a finished 
commodity is equal to the cost of the raw materials used by the coopera­
tive in producing it. Thus, use of shadow prices in the linear program­
ming framework results in the equation of marginal revenues with marginal 
costs and of average revenues with average costs. In addition, since the 
shadow prices are the per-unit monetary contributions of the raw 
materials supplied by the member firms to the finished products of the 
cooperative, each member receives the portion of the net proceeds earned 
by his output if the raw materials are assigned prices equal to their 
shadow prices. 
Although these properties of Bardie's simple linear model are 
appealing, the assumptions that must be made to obtain them are restric­
tive. Hardie attempted to make his model less restrictive by considering 
downward-sloping demand curves for some of the finished products and 
average variable costs which are not constant, suggesting that these 
could be implemented by using separable programming techniques. In 
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addition, he suggested that nonmember raw products could be introduced 
into the model by the inclusion of purchasing variables and that addi­
tional limitational inputs could be considered by the addition of more 
constraints. However, not all of the net proceeds are assigned to the 
member firms when additional constraints are added to the problem. Con­
sequently, Hardie had to correct this by using the pooling constraint 
method. 
Ladd [35] extended the analysis of Helmberger and Hoos in another 
model of a marketing cooperative. In the Ladd model, the market price of 
the raw product sold through the cooperative is not fixed as in the 
Helmberger and Hoos model but is a variable dependent upon the coopera­
tives actions. Also, Ladd presented rules for determining the optimum 
membership of the cooperative association and provided instruments which 
the cooperative could use to reach it. In addition, Ladd's cooperative 
provides three services—an item sold both to members and nonmembers 
which is used as a productive input by them, a service provided free of 
charge to members, and a bargaining service which benefits both members 
and nonmembers by affecting the price they receive for their raw product. 
Ladd alternatively considered the Helmberger and Hoos objective of 
maximizing the raw material price received by its members and the objec­
tive of maximizing the quantity of the raw material marketed through the 
cooperative. There are three instruments which are available to the 
cooperative for attaining these two objectives. These instruments are 
the price charged by the cooperative for the service used as a productive 
input by members and nonmembers, the quantity of the excludable public 
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good provided to the members of the cooperative, and the quantity of the 
bargaining service performed by the cooperative. Using these instruments, 
Ladd derived the first-order maximization conditions for each of the two 
objectives and showed that they are substantially different from each 
other and from those of a profit-maximizing proprietary firm. 
As did Hardie, Bar [8] used a linear programming framework in pre­
senting a short-run model of the cooperative association. In this model, 
the cooperative provides a number of services which the member firms use 
in their productive processes. These may include marketing services. 
Aware that both the member firms and the cooperative represent decision­
making units. Bar gave each an optimizing role in his model. Each 
member firm attempts to maximize its surplus of income over costs, which 
include payments to the cooperative for the services which it provides. 
The cooperative itself attempts to maximize the aggregate surplus of its 
member firms. 
It is assumed that the variable costs of the services provided by 
the cooperative are charged to the members per unit of service used. 
Fixed costs are also assumed to be charged to member firms in proportion 
to the quantity of services used. Thus, the problem facing the coopera­
tive is one of determining the optimal per-unit charges for covering 
Through use of linear programming theory. Bar demonstrated that the 
cooperative must set a per-unit charge for fixed costs for each service 
equal to the shadow price of the resource used to provide the service if 
it is to achieve its objective of maximizing aggregate surplus. Bar 
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noted, however, that not all fixea costs are necessarily covered through 
use of this pricing policy. Hence, he suggested that the cooperative 
must set its per-unit charges for fixed costs so as to cover all fixed 
costs with as little deviation from the optimal per unit charges as 
possible. 
Problem Selection 
The existing literature on producers cooperative associations is 
deficient in several respects. First of all, several of the models pre­
sented in the literature fail to recognize the existence of a cooperative 
dec is ion-maker. Only the more recent models of Helmberger and Hoos, 
Hardie, Ladd, and Bar include cooperative decision-makers and give them 
maximizing roles. 
Second, none of the models presented in the literature explore the 
pricing decisions which must be made by the multi-product cooperative. 
The cooperatives in the models of Phillips, Clark, and Helmberger and 
Hoes are all single-product cooperatives. Although the cooperative in 
the Ladd model provides three services to member patrons, it is not a 
multi-product cooperative in the sense that it sells more than one input 
to patrons or purchases more than one output from them. The cooperative 
in both the Hardie and Bar models are multi-product cooperatives in this 
sense. However, the cooperative in the Hardie model is strictly a mar­
keting cooperative—it provides no services to its patrons. Likewise, 
although the services provided by the cooperative in the Bar model may 
include marketing services, they are not explicitly analyzed. 
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In any case, none of the models which contain multi-product coopera­
tives are used to consider complementarity and substitution between 
products in the pricing of services. Instead, it is implicitly assumed 
in every model that patrons are charged a price for each service equal to 
the average cost of producing it. 
Third, none of the models of cooperative associations make any men­
tion of patronage refunds although they are an integral and important 
part of real-world cooperatives. Implicitly, it is assumed that the 
cooperative has perfect knowledge of what its costs are so that it can 
determine prices in such a manner that there is no surplus to be distrib­
uted at the end of the accounting period. In actuality, cooperatives 
seldom if ever can be certain of what their costs are until the end of 
the accounting period. Further, patrons do not know what their patronage 
refunds will be at the time they make their production decisions, but 
must wait until the end of the accounting period to see. No model in the 
literature suggests a mechanism for incorporating the expected patronage 
refunds of a patron into his production decisions. 
Fourth, only the Bar model discusses fixed costs at all, and it does 
not analyze the problem of allocating joint fixed costs among services. 
Instead, the method of charging overhead costs to the accounts of the 
various ser'/ices is given rather than determined within the framework of 
the model. Further, the Bar model is used only in determining the per-
unit charges for fixed costs for each service, and the method employed is 
not entirely satisfactory. 
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Fifth, the subjects of public goods and externalities have also been 
largely overlooked by the literature on cooperative associations. Only 
the Ladd model considers the provision of a public good by the coopera­
tive. The public good in the Ladd model is one which affects price. 
There is no discussion of public goods which affect production or of 
externalities in any of the models in the literature. 
Sixth, in all but the Ladd model, member patrons are assumed to deal 
exclusively with the cooperative. For example, in the Helmberger and 
Hoos model and in the Hardie model, the member patrons are contractually 
bound to do so. In the Bar model, they are obliged to do so according to 
the principles of cooperation. A general model would not ignore the 
possibility of members dealing with organizations outside the cooperative 
association. 
Finally, only the Ladd model considers trading between the coopera­
tive and nonmembers. Again, a general model would not ignore this possi­
bility. 
In view of the problems of the cooperative association which have 
not been dealt with adequately in the literature, an attempt is made in 
this study to develop a more general short-run model. Both the coopera­
tive and the patrons in this model are multi-product organizations. The 
cooperative both markets outputs of those it serves and provides them 
with factors of production. 
Some of these factors of production are public goods. These public 
goods affect production but not prices. The complexities of including 
public goods which affect prices are avoided in this study. Similarly, 
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the discussion of externalities between firms is left to the public 
finance literature. 
Within this model, it is assumed that the cooperative does not know 
its costs until the end of its accounting period. Thus, the determina­
tion of patronage refunds is necessary. Further, it is assumed that 
patrons do not know what their patronage refunds are until the end of the 
accounting period and that the allocation of joint fixed costs is not 
given but determined within the model. 
Finally, it is assumed that member firms do not need to deal exclu­
sively with the cooperative and that nonmembers, as well as members, trade 
with the cooperative. 
The model of the cooperative and the models of the member and non-
member patrons presented in this study are nonlinear programming models. 
Nonlinear programming is used so that the model can be as general as 
possible and so that the results of the model are not contingent upon the 
assumptions of more specific programming tools. This is a normative-
prescriptive study in that it attempts to explain how cooperatives should 
behave if they are to act to achieve specified goals, not how they 
actually behave. 
Following Chapters 
In Chapter II, the models of a typical member patron and of a typi­
cal nonmember patron are presented. 
In Chapter III, a model of the cooperative in which the total profits 
of the member patrons are maximized is presented. In this chapter, the 
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Kuhn-Tucker conditions corresponding to the model are presented, but are 
not interpreted. 
In Chapter IV, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions presented in Chapter III 
are interpreted. Several simplifications of the model are presented and 
are compared to the models presented in the literature. 
In Chapter V, the general model of the cooperative is extended to 
include consideration of the future effects on the member patron's 
profits of current decisions. 
Finally, Chapter VI consists of a summary, conclusions, and sugges­
tions for further research. 
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CHAPTER II. PATRON MODELS 
General Model 
In this chapter, a model of a typical member patron and a model of 
a typical nonmember patron are presented. These models are sub-models 
of the general mcdel of the cooperative association. In the general 
model of the cooperative association, it is assumed that there are more 
than one member patron and more than one nonmember patron as well as 
the cooperative. 
The relationships between the various sub-models are indicated in 
Figure 2.1. In this figure, flows of goods are indicated by heavy 
arrows while lighter arrows are used to indicate flows of cash or 
credit. Broken arrows are used to indicate flows of patronage refunds. 
As can be seen from the figure, the cooperative purchases unproc­
essed products (set X) from member and nonmember patrons and supplies 
them with variable inputs (set Y) which they use in production. The 
cooperative determines the price it will offer its patrons for each of 
the unprocessed products it purchases from them. Similarly, it deter­
mines the price it will charge its patrons for each of the variable in­
puts which it sells them. 
Not all of the inputs which the cooperative supplies to its patrons 
are sold, however. Some of them are public goods (set G). Because it 
is assumed that nonpayers cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits 
of these public goods, the cooperative does not sell them. Instead, it 
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Figure 2.1. Model of the cooperative association. 
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provides them to both member and nonmember patrons free of charge and 
finances them from other business. 
In addition to doing business with member and nonmember patrons, 
the cooperative deals with buyers and sellers outside the cooperative 
association. The cooperative purchases variable inputs (set V) for use 
in processing the unprocessed products which it purchases from its 
patrons and for use in producing the inputs which it supplies its 
patrons. It also sells the processed products (set Z). 
In this model, a product of the member and nonmember firms which is 
simply marketed by the cooperative could be included as a special case 
of an unprocessed product purchased by the cooperative and sold as a 
processed product without the use of inputs. However, because it is 
assumed that the marketing of any product through the cooperative 
requires the use of some inputs, there is technically no difference 
between a product processed by the cooperative and one marketed through 
it and no distinction is made between the two. Similarly, no distinc­
tion is made between a variable input supplied to member and nonmember 
firms by the cooperative which is produced by the cooperative and one 
which is simply purchased by the cooperative and resold to member and 
nonmember firms. 
The coopérative distributes patronage refunds to its member patrons, 
but it is assumed that there is no legal or economic reason for it to 
distribute them to nonmembers. The cooperative also pays members divi­
dends on stock, but it is assumed for convenience, that nonmembers hold 
no stock in the cooperative. 
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Finally, it can be observed from the figure that member patrons do 
not do business exclusively with the cooperative. Instead, they pur­
chase variable inputs frcs outside the cooperative association as well 
as from the cooperative. The relationships between nonmember patrons 
and outside markets are not represented in the figure because they are 
not relevant to the model. 
Model of a Member Patron 
In the sub-models of the typical member patron and the typical 
nonmember patron, it is assumed that each firm attempts to maximize 
its profit. This is the assumption common to all of the short-run 
models of cooperative associations reviewed in this study. 
The set of products produced by the member and nonmember patrons is 
represented by X. The subset of products in X which are sold to the 
cooperative is represented by X^ while the subset of products which are 
sold to buyers outside the cooperative association is represented by 
X^. Similarly, the set of variable factors of production purchased by 
the patron firms is represented by Y. The subset of variable inputs in 
Y purchased from the cooperative is represented by Y^ while the subset 
of variable inputs purchased from sellers outside the cooperative 
association is represented by Y^. Both the member and noiuaember patrons 
are assumed to be price-takers with respect to all of the prices they 
pay for variable inputs and receive for products. 
The set of fixed factors of production which are available to the 
typical member patron or to the typical nonmember patron is represented 
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by W^. Just as each of the products in set X and each of the variable 
factors in set Y have prices associated with them, the fixed factors in 
set have per-unit costs attached to the=. 
In this model, it is assumed that the patrons have perfect knowl­
edge of the prices. In other words, they are assumed to have full 
knowledge of all prices at the time they make their production decisions. 
However, it is assumed that the cooperative determines the per-unit 
patronage refunds for the products which it buys and the inputs which 
it sells at the end of its accounting period, after all purchases and 
sales have been made. Thus, the member patrons have only a limited 
knowledge, based on past refunds, of what the per-unit patronage refunds 
will be at the time they make their production decisions. 
Hence, the typical member patron attempts to maximize its profit 
by maximizing its expected profit: 
TT = S p.q. - S p.q. - fc + ds + pvpr (2.1) 
ieX ^ ^ iCY ^ ^ 
where p^ and are, respectively, the price paid or received and the 
quantity of the i-th product or factor, where fc is the fixed costs of 
the firm, where ds is the dividends on stock held by the member patron, 
and where pvpr is the present value of the patronage refunds which the 
firm expects to be allocated. The latter can be expressed: 
pvpr = [s + ] 2 r. q. (2.2) 
(1+d) iec 
where s is the proportion of patronage refunds paid in cash and (1-s) is 
the proportion deferred to a revolving fund of length T. The symbol C 
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represents the set of products sold to and factors purchased from the 
•k 
cooperative and the symbol r^ represents the expected per-unit patronage 
refund on the i-th product or factor in this set. The symbol d repre­
sents the discount rate. In this problem, the appropriate discount rate 
might be the opportunity cost represented by the interest rate paid by 
the patron on long-term debt. 
It is assumed that the expected per-unit patronage refund on the 
i-th product or factor is a function of the actual per-unit patronage 
refunds on the same product or factors in past periods : 
r^ = r^ (r^(t-l), i\(t-2), ...) for all igC. (2.3) 
No attempt is made within this study to specify the structure of this 
function. Many suitable models for specifying an expected price as a 
function of past prices exist elsewhere. 
The technology of the firm is represented by a production function 
which, in its implicit form, is written: 
0(q%, qy, , Q^) = o (2.4) 
where is a vector of the quantities of each of the products in set X 
produced by the firm, q^ is a vector of the quantities of each of the 
variable factors in set Y used in production, and q^ is a vector of 
r 
the quantities of each of the fixed factors in set used in produc­
tion. The symbol represents a vector of the quantities of each of 
the set G of public goods provided by the cooperative. 
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It is assumed that the production function 2.4 possesses continuous 
first- and second-order partial derivatives which are different from 
zero for all its nontrivial solutions and that it is written in such a 
way that the partial derivatives with respect to the outputs are posi­
tive and the partial derivatives with respect to the inputs are nega­
tive. It is further assumed that 2.4 is subject to diminishing returns 
such that all one-output production functions obtained from 2,4 by fix­
ing the values of all other outputs are strictly concave. 
The problem of the member patron is that of choosing the level of 
output for each product in set X, the level of each variable factor in 
set Y to be used in production of each product in set X, and the level 
of each fixed factor in set to be used in production of each product 
in set X such that profit 2.1 is maximized. This maximization is sub­
ject, of course, to the production function 2.4 and a set of constraints 
which ensure use of each fixed factor does not exceed the quantity 
available. If the quantity of the i-th fixed factor used in production 
is represented by q^ and the stock of the factor is represented by 
a constraint of this type can be expressed: 
(2.5) 
The Lagrangian function for this problem can, therefore, be 
written: 
A = r p.q. - 2 p.q. + [s + r r q 
iSX iSY (1+d) iec 
+ ¥i.0(qx, qy, q^ , Qg) + S '^2i^'^i0 " ^i^ 
f iGWj. 
( 2 . 6 )  
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where is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the production 
function 2.4 and the are the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to 
the fixed-factor constraints 2.5. 
Corresponding to the Lagrangian function 2.6 is a set of Kuhn-
Tucker conditions. These are necessary conditions for a global maximum. 
They are sufficient conditions for a global maximum if the objective 
function is concave, the constraints are concave, and the set of feasible 
solutions is bounded and nonempty. It is assumed that marginal costs 
may increase or decrease with increases in output, but that if marginal 
costs are decreasing, the absolute value of the rate of decrease must be 
less than or equal to that of the rate of decrease of the marginal reve­
nue function. Thus, the profit function 2.1 is concave. It has already 
been assumed that the production function 2.4 is concave. The fixed-
factor constraints 2.5 are linear and, therefore, can be considered as 
concave. Thus, if it is assumed that the set of feasible solutions are 
bounded and nonempty, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and 
sufficient for a global maximum. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the problem represented by 2.5 are 
as follows: 
for all igX^: 
(2.7a) 
% A (2.7b) 
q. s 0 
1 
(2.7c) 
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for all iSX : 
o 
(2.8a) 
q. a 0 
(2.8b) 
(2.8c) 
for all iCY : 
c 
(2.9a) 
It • ° 
(2.9b) 
q. ^  0 (2.9c) 
for all isY^: 
It = " -1 It ' ° (2.10a) 
° ° 
q. 2 0 
(2.10b) 
(2.10c) 
for all ieW^: 
M_ - w _ 
Sq^ '1 Sqj, 
(2.11a) 
iA 
ôq^ ° 
q. 2 0 
(2.11b) 
(2.11c) 
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for Y 
1" 
1?^ 0(qx' Sfg' ° (2.12) 
for Ygi* iSW^: 
- q. ^ 0 
X 
(2.13a) 
(2.13b) 
(2.13c) 
The interpretation of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem 
is facilitated by first discussing the meaning of the Lagrange multi­
pliers. In general, the value of a Lagrange multiplier at a solution 
indicates how much the value of the objective function will change given 
can be interpreted as the imputed value or shadow price of the i-th 
fixed factor 
In interpreting Naylor [40, p. 328] suggests that ^ be treated 
as if it were an arbitrary product. Then Y, can be interpreted as the 
imputed value or shadow price of 0. This interpretation then becomes 
useful in interpreting two other terms which include If i is a 
product, the negative of the partial derivative can be inter­
preted as the rate of product transformation or the marginal cost of 
a one-unit change in the corresponding constraint constant. Thus, Yg 
Y = -
23- ôq^q 
_aiL isWf . (2.14) 
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product i in terms of 0. Thus, can be interpreted as the 
marginal imputed cost of producing the i-th product. On the other hand, 
if i is an input, the partial derivative ô0/ôq,. is the marginal product 
of input i with respect to 0 and Y^(ô0/ôq^) can be interpreted as the 
marginal value product of the i-th input. 
Unfortunately, there are some methodological difficulties involved 
in using this approach,^ and it is useful to avoid the problem of giving 
an economic interpretation and to interpret -Y^(50/Bq^) for outputs 
and ¥j^(ô0/ôq^) for inputs directly instead of in parts. It is possible 
to mathematically demonstrate that at a profit-maximizing level, the 
former is equal to the marginal cost of producing the i-th product and 
that the latter is equal to the marginal value product of the i-th input 
2 
without interpreting if certain conditions are met. 
For example, because the production function is expressed in 
implicit form, 0 is equal to zero. Therefore, ôtt/ô0 is equivalent to 
ÔTT/50. This term has no economic meaning. 
Further, by the implicit function rule of calculus, the partial 
derivative of 0 with respect to the quantity of the i-th input or output 
is equal to: 
àji-
. ôq. 
^ . (2.15) 
ôq. M 
The denominator, the partial derivative of 0 with respect to itself, is 
equal to one. Thus, ô0/ôqj[ is equal to the negative of itself. The only 
way that this can be true is if ô0/ôqi is equal to zero. If this is 
true, interpreting -Y,(ô0/ôq.) for the i-th output as its marginal im­
puted cost and YiCcîô/oq.) for the i-th input as its marginal value 
product is meaningless. 
2 See the first two proofs in Appendix B. 
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It is important to point out that the marginal costs in this model 
are distinct from the marginal variable costs found in models of the 
single-product firm. Any marginal cost in this model may include the 
"marginal opportunity cost" of using fixed factors of production. 
Inclusion of this is necessary when the production of an additional 
unit of a particular product draws use of a fully-employed fixed factor 
away from the production of other products. The opportunity cost of 
the fully-employed fixed factor is represented by its shadow price.^ 
Although this is an internal cost, it is just as real as any other. This 
concept of a marginal opportunity cost is recognized by Swenson [50, 
pp. 57-58 and p. 77] and is dealt with in greater detail by Rothman 
[46, pp. 58-67]. 
With this established, it is possible to proceed with interpreting 
the first set of Kuhn-Tucker conditions. These conditions are repre­
sented by 2.7a through 2.7c and correspond to the products produced by 
the firm and sold to the cooperative. Condition 2.7a can be rewritten: 
p .  + [s + ^^ for all ieX . (2.16) 
(l+d)"^ 1 1 Bq^ c 
The term on the left-hand side of the inequality is the effective price 
the member patron expects from the sale of product i to the cooperative 
and is equivalent to the cash price plus the discounted expected 
^These costs are considered in the total differential of the cost 
equation in Proof 1 through the inclusion of the term S Y . dq. in 
A.2. iew^ 
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per-unit patronage refund on the product. The term on the right-hand 
side is equal to the marginal cost of producing product i. 
Condition 2.7c requires that the quantity of product i produced 
must be nonnegative. If a positive quantity of product i is produced, 
condition 2.7b guarantees that 2.16 is an equality. In other words, for 
maximum profit, if the i-th product is produced, it should be produced 
up to the point at which the marginal cost of producing it is equal to 
its effective price, i.e., the cash price plus the discounted expected 
per-unit patronage refund on the product. If 2.16 is satisfied as a 
strict inequality, i.e., if the effective price of product i is less 
than the marginal cost of producing it, condition 2.7b guarantees that 
none is produced. 
The next set of conditions is represented by 2.8a through 2.8c and 
corresponds to the products produced by the firm and sold outside the 
cooperative association. Condition 2.8a can be rewritten: 
^ ^9 — — — ^ — / a "t \ p. ^ — ror ail it A. . 
1 1 ôqj; o 
The term on the left-hand side of the inequality is the price of 
product i. Again, the term on the right-hand side is equal to the mar­
ginal cost of producing the i-th product-
Condition 2.8c requires that the quantity of product i produced 
must be nonnegative. If a positive quantity of product i is produced, 
condition 2.8b guarantees that 2.17 is an equality. In other words, for 
a maximum, if the i-th product is produced, it should be produced up 
to the point at which the marginal cost of producing it is equal to the 
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price. If 2.17 is satisfied as a strict inequality, i.e., if the price 
of product i is less than the marginal cost of producing it, condition 
2.8b guarantees that none is produced. 
Thus, the interpretations of conditions 2.7a through 2.7c and of 
2.8a through 2.8c are very similar. The only difference between 2.16 
and 2.17 is that there is no discounted expected per-unit patronage 
refund term in the latter since the member patron receives no patronage 
refunds on products sold outside the cooperative association. 
The conditions represented by 2,9a through 2.9c correspond to the 
use of the i-th variable factor of production purchased from the 
cooperative. Condition 2.9a can be rewritten: 
p - [s + r * a Y 36- for all ieY (2.18) 
(1+d) ®^i 
The term on the left-hand side of the inequality is the effective price 
the member patron expects to pay the cooperative for input i and is 
equivalent to the cash price less the discounted expected per-unit 
patronage refund on the input. The term on the right-hand side is equal 
to the marginal value product on input i. 
Condition 2.9c requires that the quantity of input i used must be 
nonnegative. If a positive quantity of input i is used, condition 2.9b 
guarantees that 2.18 is an equality. In other words, for a maximum, if 
the i-th input is used, it should be used up to the point at which its 
marginal value product is equal to its effective price, i.e., the cash 
price less the discounted expected per-unit patronage refund on the 
input. If 2.18 is satisfied as a strict inequality, i.e., if the 
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effective price of input i is greater than its marginal value product, 
condition 2.9b guarantees that none is used. 
Similar conditions corresponding to the use of the i-th variable 
input purchased from outside the cooperative association are represented 
by 2.10a through 2.10c. Condition 2.10a can be rewritten: 
p. s for all icY . (2.19) 
1 1 0^^ o 
The term on the left-hand side of the inequality is the price of input 
i. Again, the term on the right-hand side is equal to the marginal 
value product of input i. 
Condition 2.10c requires that the quantity of input i used must be 
nonnegative. If a positive quantity of input i is used, condition 2.10b 
guarantees that 2.19 is an equality. In other words, for a maximum, if 
the i-th input is used, it should be used up to the point at which its 
marginal value product is equal to its price. If 2.19 is satisfied as 
a strict inequality, i.e., if the price of input i is greater than its 
marginal value product, condition 2.10b guarantees that none is used. 
Thus, the interpretations of conditions 2.9a through 2.9c and of 
2.10a through 2.10c are also very similar. The only difference between 
2.18 and 2.19 is that there is no discounted expected per-unit patronage 
refund term in the latter since the member patron receives no patronage 
refunds on inputs purchased from outside the cooperative association. 
The conditions represented by 2.11a through 2.11c correspond to 
the use of the fixed factors of production. Condition 2.11a can be 
rewritten; 
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^21 2 àë- for all iCW^. (2.20) 
As noted, the Lagrange multiplier on the left-hand side of the inequality 
is the imputed value or shadow price of the i-th fixed factor. The term 
on the right-hand side is its marginal value product. 
Condition 2.11c requires that the quantity of the i-th fixed factor 
used must be nonnegative. If a positive quantity of the i-th fixed 
factor is used, condition 2.11b guarantees that 2.20 is an equality. In 
other words, at a maximum, if the i-th input is used, its imputed value 
is equal to its marginal value product. If 2.20 is satisfied as a 
strict inequality, i.e., if the imputed value of the i-th fixed factor is 
greater than its marginal value product, condition 2.11b guarantees that 
none is used. 
This result by itself may not appear to be too meaningful. However, 
it assumes more meaning in the discussion, found later in this section, 
of competing uses for a fixed factor. It also becomes more meaningful 
when related to conditions 2,13a through 2.13c. 
Condition 2.12 is simply a restatement of the firm's production 
function. 
Conditions 2.13a through 2.13c correspond to the fixed-factor con­
straints 2.5; In facts condition 2,13a is a restatement of 2.5. Con­
dition 2.13c requires that the imputed value of the i-th fixed factor 
must be nonnegative. If the imputed value of the factor is positive, 
condition 2.13b guarantees that 2.13a is an equality. If 2.13a is 
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satisfied as a strict Inequality, 2.13b guarantees that the imputed 
value is equal to zero. 
These results can be represented by the complementary slackness 
conditions : 
In other words, at a maximum, if the imputed value of the i-th fixed 
factor is positive, the stock of the factor must be exhausted. If the 
stock is not exhausted, i.e., if there is slack, the imputed value of 
the factor nnat be zero. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions 2.11a through 2.11c guarantee that, at 
a maximum, if the i-th fixed input is used, its imputed value is equal 
to its marginal value product. Thus, conditions 2.21a and 2.21b imply 
that if the i-th fixed input is used, it will be exhausted unless its 
marginal value product is equal to zero. This is illustrated by 
Figure 2.2. If the stock of the i-th factor is equal to q^g, it will be 
exhausted because the marginal value product or imputed value is posi­
tive at that point. On the other hand, if the stock is equal to q^^, it 
will only be used up to the point at which its marginal value product 
or imputed value is equal to zero. For the rest of this chapter, it is 
assumed that each of the fixed factors is used and that the marginal 
value product of each is positive so that the factor is exhausted. This 
does not seem to be an unrealistic assumption. 
(2.21a) 
if q^ < q^Q for all iSW^ (2.21b) 
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Letting: 
* 
= P^, the cash price, for all ieX^, Y^, 
* * T 
= + s-r^ + (1-s) r^ /(1+c) , the effective price, 
for all igX^, 
= p^ - s*r. - (1-s) r^ /(l+d)^\, the effective price, 
for all ieY^, 
= ^2i' imputed value or shadow price, for all ieW^, 
additional light can be shed on the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. If all 
exceed zero, conditions 2.16 through 2.20 are equivalent to: 
p. = -Y, for all ieX (2.22) 
1 1 oq^ 
and: 
p. = for all ieY, W . (2.23) 
1 i dq^ r 
For an output, condition 2.22 requires that it be produced up to 
the point at which its marginal cost equals its price or effective 
price. For an input, condition 2.23 requires that it be used up to the 
point at which its marginal value product equals its price, effective 
price, or imputed value. 
Selecting any two of the equations of the type 2.23, dividing one 
by the other, and using the implicit function rule results in the 
condition: 
* 
—T = -— = - r—^ for all k, ^  gX. (2.24) 
P / ^ aq. 
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It requires that the marginal rate of transformation for every pair of 
outputs, holding the levels of all other outputs and all inputs constant, 
must equal the ratio of their prices or effective prices. A similar 
condition for all k, -tcY, can be derived by selecting any two of the 
equations of the type 2.23, It requires that the marginal rate of 
technical substitution for every pair of inputs, holding the levels of 
all outputs and all other inputs constant, must equal the ratio of their 
prices, effective prices, or imputed values. 
Selecting any one of the equations of the type 2.22 and any one of 
the equations of the type 2.23, dividing the latter by the former, and 
using the implicit function rule results in: 
for all kSY, W.; all teX. (2.25) 
* ^ 
^ aq k 
* 
Multiplying 2.25 by p^ results in the condition: 
* * ^9? 
P, = P. • -— for all kSY, W.; all ^ X. (2.26) 
^k ^ 
This requires that the marginal value product of each input with respect 
to each output must equal the price, effective price, or imputed value 
of the input. It follows that the marginal value products of an input 
with respect to all outputs must be equal. Given conditions 2.11a 
through 2.11c, it also follows that if the marginal value product of a 
fixed input used in a particular output is less than the imputed value 
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of the input determined by its marginal value product in other uses, it 
will not be used in the production of the output. 
Using the notation developed in the previous section, it is 
possible to describe a model of a typical nontnember patron. The profit 
function of the nonmember patron is similar to that of the typical 
member patron except that it does not include a dividend-on-stock tem 
or a present-value-of-patronage-refunds term: 
Model of a Nonmember Patron 
t I (2.27) 
The corresponding Lagrangian function is: 
(2 .28)  
and the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: 
for all igX: 
(2.29a) 
(2.29b) 
(2.29c) 
for all iGY: 
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% = -"i + ''i 1% ' " (2.30a) 
It: • "i ' ° 
q. ^  0 
1 
(2.30b) 
(2.30c) 
for all i€W^: 
= V M_ _ y g 0 
3q. "1 aq. ^2i 
(2.31a) 
Sq. 
= 0 
q. ^  0 
1 
(2.31b) 
(2.31c) 
for 
=«(qx. qy. V = ° (2.32) 
for all igWg: 
' °-io - "i ^  0 (2.33a) 
(2.33b) 
^21 ' 
(2.33c) 
The interpretation of these conditions is similar to that of those of 
the model of the typical member patron. 
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Output Supply and Input Demand Functions 
Output supply functions and input demand functions for the typical 
member and the typical nonmember pat/^ns can be derived from the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions. For example, if it is assumed that the typical member 
patron produces all of the products in set X, uses all of the variable 
factors in set Y, and exhausts all of the fixed factors in set W^, condi­
tions 2.16 through 2.20, as well as 2.13a, can be written as equalities. 
Thus, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are equivalent to: 
p. + [s + ]r. + Y, = 0 for all ieX (2.34) 
^ (1+d)'^ 1 J- c*q^ c 
p. + Yt ^ =0 for all ieX (2.35) 
1 1 ôq^ 0 
p .  + [s + ]r. + Y. - 0 for all igY (2.36) 
(W)"^ 1 laq. 
p. + Y, ^  =0 for all ieY (2.37) 
1 1 aq^ o 
Y, ^  - ï-. = 0 for all ieW (2.38) 
1 ôq. Zi r 
#(%%, qy' % , Qg) = 0 (2.39) 
q^Q - q^ = 0 for all ieW^. (2.40) 
These conditions are the first-order conditions for the classical program­
ming problem of maximizing the Lagrangian function 2.6. They can be 
solved for the optimal values of the variables as functions of the 
parameters if the determinant of the Jacobian matrix J is nonvanishing, 
where : 
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and where 0^ represents the first-order partial derivative o0/oq^ and 0^^ 
2 
represents the second-order partial derivative 5 0/ôq^ôqj-
The matrix J is the bordered Hessian matrix for the classical pro­
gramming problem and must be negative definite if the first-order condi­
tions 2.36 through 2.40 are to be sufficient conditions for a maximum. 
Therefore, J must be nonsingular and the conditions can be solved for the 
optimal values of the variables. 
By doing so, output supply functions, relating the optimal level of 
each product to the prices, the expected per-unit patronage refunds, and 
the quantities of the public goods provided by the cooperative, can be 
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determined for the typical member patron. Similarly, input demand 
functions, relating the optimal level of each variable input to the same 
parameters, can be determined for the member patron. Both sets of these 
functions can be represented: 
q. = Py, r/, Qg) ieX, Y (2.42) 
where is a vector of the prices of the products in set X, is a 
* 
vector of the prices of the variable inputs in set Y, and R^ is a vector 
of the expected per-unit patronage refunds on the products in set C. 
By horizontally summing the individual output supply functions for 
product i in set X across all member patrons, a supply function, relating 
the level of the output supplied by the member patrons to the parameters, 
can be determined. In a similar manner, a demand function, relating the 
level of the i-th variable factor in set Y demanded by the member patrons 
to the parameters, can be determined by horizontally summing the individ­
ual input functions for the factor across all member patrons. 
Because the per-unit patronage refunds expected by the member patrons 
may vary from patron to patron, both sets of these functions are best 
written in terms of a vector of past actual per-unit patronage refunds 
instead of the expected per-unit patronage refund. These functions can 
be represented; 
"ic = "ic ("x' fy V ^ 0.43) 
where R^^ is a vector of past actual per-unit patronage refunds on the 
products in set C. Although the cooperative cannot affect current 
expectations with changes in the current-year per-unit patronage refunds. 
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it can affect future expectations with them and, thus, can affect future 
member behavior with them. 
Using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions corresponding to the typical non-
member patron, output supply functions and input demand functions for 
the nonmember patron can be derived. These are similar to those for the 
typical member patron and represented by 2.42 except that they do not 
include the expected per-unit patronage refund argument. Horizontally 
summing these functions across all nonmember patrons, supply and demand 
functions, relating the levels of nonmember supply and demand to the 
prices and the quantities of the public goods provided by the coopera­
tive, can be determined. Both sets of these functions can be repre­
sented: 
^io ° "!io "g' isx- ".44) 
As prices change, as expected per-unit patronage refunds change, 
and as the quantities of the public goods provided by the cooperative 
change, the typical member or nonmember patron will alter his input and 
output levels to satisfy his first-order conditions. The partial deriva­
tive of q^ with respect to any argument in 2.42 shows the effect on the 
_ith output or input of the typical member patron of a one-unit change in 
that argument. 
Evaluation of these partial derivatives begins with differeritiating 
conditions 2.34 through 2.40 totally with respect to all variables and 
the parameters in 2.42. The corresponding total differentials are: 
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 ^''' + Ti#ijdqj + ... + 
+ dp. + [s + ] dr. =0 for all igX (2.45) 
^ (1+d)^ "• = 
Yl0il<iqi + + ... + Y^,^.jdq^ + ... + *^dY^ 
+ dp. =0 for all ieX (2.46) 
1 o 
l^^ il^ i^ "•" + ... + 0^ dY^  
- dp. + [s + ] dr. =0 for all ieX (2.47) 
(l+d)'^ 1 
- dp^ = 0 for all isY^ (2.48) 
Yl^il^qi + ?i0i2d42 + "" + %i#ijdqj + ... + #idY^ 
- dVg^ = 0 for all igW^ (2.49) 
0^dq^ + 02<iq2 + ... + ^jdq^ + ... =0 (2.50) 
-dq^ = 0 for all igW^.. (2.51) 
In order to solve this system of equations for the unknowns dq^ 
(ieX, Y), the changes in the parameters in 2.42 are treated as constants. 
This allows the system to be expressed as the matrix equation 2.52 where : 
dp. " = dp. + [s + ] dr. for all ieX , 
(1+d)'^ ^ 
= dp^ for all isX^, 
= -dp. + [s + ] dr. for all is Y , 
(1-M)'' ^ 
= -dp^ for all isYg, 
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and where, from left to right, the first matrix is the Jacobian matrix J 
represented by 2.41, the second is the vector of unknowns, and the third 
is the vector of constants. 
Using Cramer's rule, the matrix equation can be solved for the k-th 
unknown by replacing the k-th column of J by the vector of constants. 
The solution is then equal to the determinant of this matrix divided by 
the determinant of J. Letting D represent the determinant of J and 
letting represent the cofactor of the element in the i-th row and 
j-th column of J: 
- Z 0. dq. D 1 / D for all keX, Y (2.53) 
jeG J J SkJ/ 
where -Z #.dq. is the g-th element in the vector of constants. The 
jeG ^ J 
partial derivative ôq^/ôp^ is determined by dividing 2.53 by dp^ and set­
ting all other differentials equal to zero. Thus: 
for all & s X (2.54) 
D 
and 
r— = —~ for all -t e Y. (2.55) 
In general, it is difficult to assess the signs of the partial 
derivatives of the types 2.54 and 2.55. The cross-effects may be of 
either sign depending of the particular form of the implicit production 
function. However, the signs of the own-price effects can be 
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ascertained. If k = t, it is always possible to re-order the rows and 
columns of J so that the k-th row and column are the first row and 
column. Thus, is a principal minor of J of the order of one less 
than the order of J. Because it is assumed J is negative definite, 
and D must be of opposite signs. Thus, 2.54 and 2.55 are respectively 
positive and negative. In other words, an increase in the price of the 
k-th output, other prices constant, will have the expected effect of 
increasing the quantity supplied while an increase of the price of the 
k-th input, other prices constant, will have the expected effect of 
decreasing the quantity demanded. 
* 
Taking 2.53, dividing by dr^, and setting all other differentials 
equal to zero: 
—Z = - [s + for all & e C. (2.56) 
Again, in general, it is difficult to assess the signs of the partial 
derivatives of the type 2.56. The cross-effects mzy be cf either sign 
depending upon the particular form of the implicit production function. 
However, the signs of the own-price effects can be ascertained. is 
again of the opposite sign of D and the quantity within the brackets is 
positive. Thus, 2.56 is positive. In other words, an increase in the 
expected per-unit patronage refund on the k-th output or input, other 
prices constant, will have the effect of increasing the quantity supplied 
or demanded. 
Although the current behavior of the member patron is not affected by 
changes in the actual per-unit patronage refunds in the current period. 
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these changes can affect behavior in future periods. From 2.3, it can be 
seen that the current per-unit patronage refund on product i affects the 
expected per-unit patronage refunds on product i in future periods. Thus, 
for example, the effect on the quantity of i supplied or demanded in the 
next period of an increase in the current per-unit patronage refund on i 
is equivalent to: 
ôq.(t+l) ôq.(t+l) ôr.(t+l) 
* 
If ôr^(t+l)/ôr^ is assumed to be positive in sign, so will 2.57. 
Again taking 2.53, but dividing by dq^ where tsG, and setting all 
other differentials equal to zero: 
'[isX^ Y.W/"''l V 
t e G (2.58) 
f 
As for the cross-effects for 2.54 through 2.56, these effects may be of 
either sign depending on the particular form of the implicit production 
function. In other words, nothing can be said, a priori, about the 
effect of an increase in the ^ -th public good provided by the cooperative 
on the quantity of the k-th product supplied or demanded. 
This analysis has been for the typical member patron. A similar 
analysis can be carried out for the typical nonmember patron. 
59 
CHAPTER III. COOPERATIVE SUB-MODEL 
Activities 
The cooperative purchases a set of products from its member and 
nonmember patrons and sells them a set of variable inputs which it 
produces. It also provides member and nonmember patrons with a set of 
public goods G and produces a set of products Z which it sells to com­
modity markets. Production of its various outputs necessitates the use 
of a set of variable inputs V purchased from outside the cooperative 
association and a set of innuts W , the Quantities of which are fixed in 
c 
the short-run. 
Objective Function 
The cooperative decision-maker is assumed to maximize the total 
profits of its member patrons: 
n = I p.q. - S p.q. - FCM + DS + FVPR " (3.1) 
ieX " isY 
where q^^ is the total quantity of product i purchased or sold by the 
member patrons, FCM is the total fixed costs of the member patrons, DS 
is the total dividend on member stock, and PVPR is the present value of 
allocated patronage refunds. 
It is assumed that the cooperative decision-maker maximizes the 
profits of its member patrons for two reasons. First, if the cooperative 
is viewed as an extension of the member patrons or if it is understood 
that the purpose of the cooperative is to benefit the member patrons, 
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maximization of the total profits of the member patrons is consistent 
with the assumption that member patrons maximize profits. Second, much 
of the theory of the proprietary firm is based on the assumption of 
profit maximization » Thus, the assumption that the cooperative maximizes 
the total profits of the member patrons allows the behavior of the 
cooperative to be contrasted with that of the proprietary firm. 
Production Function 
The technology of the cooperative is represented by a production 
function which, in its implicit form, is written: 
$ (Qg, Qy, Qg, Qx» Qy Qw ) = ^ (3.2) 
c 
where is a vector of the quantities of each of the products in set Z 
produced by the cooperative and sold outside the cooperative association, 
is a vector of the quantities of each of the variable factors in set Y 
produced by the cooperative and sold to patrons, Qg is a vector of the 
quantities of each of the public goods in set G produced by the coopera­
tive, is a vector of the quantities of each of the goods in set X pro­
duced by patrons and used in production by the cooperative, is a vector 
of the quantities of each of the variable factors in set V used in produc­
tion by the cooperative and purchased from outside the cooperative 
association, and is a vector of the quantities of each of the fixed 
c 
factors in set used in production by the cooperative. 
The assumptions made concerning this production function are similar 
to those made concerning the production function of the typical member 
patron 2.4. It is assumed that the production function 3.2 possesses 
6 1  
continuous first- and second-order partial derivatives which are differ­
ent from zero for all its nontrivial solutions and that it is written 
in such a way that the partial derivatives with respect to the outputs 
are positive and the partial derivatives with respect to the inputs are 
negative. It is further assumed that 3.2 is subject to diminishing 
returns such that all one-product production functions obtained from 
3.2 by fixing the values of all other outputs are strictly concave. 
Distribution of Net Savings 
Patronage refunds 
In this model, it is assumed that only members receive patronage 
refunds. A 1966 amendment to the federal income tax law requires that 
at least 20 percent of allocated patronage refunds must be distributed 
in cash. In the past, many cooperatives paid in cash only this minimum 
required by law. More recently, however, pressure from patrons has, in 
some instances, resulted in increases in the percentage of allocated 
patronage refunds paid in cash. This pressure stems from che tax con­
siderations of patrons, who are required to pay income taxes not only on 
that portion of allocated patronage refunds paid in cash but on that 
portion deferred to the revolving fund. 
Iowa law restricts the percentage of allocated patronage refunds 
paid in cash to not more than 20 percent if there exist unpaid deferred 
patronage refunds from past years. Typically unpaid deferred patronage 
refunds from past years exist because the use of revolving funds is a 
COTimon method of cooperative financing. However, a number of Iowa 
cooperatives have been able to increase the percentage of allocated 
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patronage refunds paid in cash by converting deferred patronage refunds 
from past years into preferred stock, on which a fixed rate of return is 
paid. 
In general, it seems reasonable to assume that the percentage of 
allocated patronage refunds paid in cash is fixed. Most cooperatives 
pay in cash the same percentage of allocated patronage refunds year after 
year. In fact, the percentage of allocated patronage refunds paid in 
cash may be fixed in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws of the 
cooperative if not by the laws of the state in which the cooperative is 
incorporated. 
The length of the revolving fund is variable. Most cooperatives, 
however, feel obligated, once a revolving fund has been set up, to make 
a concerted attempt at retiring the deferred refunds after a given length 
of time although this may be difficult or impossible to do. At least, 
the cooperative can be presumed to have an expectation for the length of 
the revolving fund. Thus, to assume that the length of the revolving 
fund in this model is known and fixed should not affect the analysis. 
Dividends on stock 
The stock of a cooperative is generally divided into common and pre­
ferred stock. Usually, purchase of a share of common stock is a condi­
tion of membership and members are limited to one share each. Although 
common stock is voting stock, many cooperatives choose not to pay divi­
dends on shares of common stock so that members receive all returns on a 
patronage basis. 
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Usually, the sale of preferred stock is not restricted to members 
and there is no limit on the number of shares an individual may hold. 
Preferred stock is nonvoting stock, and, whereas common stock is owner­
ship stock, preferred stock is investment stock. Preferred stock repre­
sents money invested into the cooperative for the dividend which it 
earns. 
The Capper-Volstead Act restricts the rate of return on all coopera­
tive stock to no more than 8 percent per annum. State laws may require 
that the rate of return on cooperative stock be limited to a rate less 
than 8 percent per annum. In addition, state law may require that the 
rate of return be fixed so that cooperative stock is, in effect, interest-
bearing. Iowa law, for example, requires that the rate of return on 
preferred stock must be fixed by the articles of incorporation at a rate 
not exceeding 8 percent per annum. 
The rate of return on capital stock in the cooperative in this model 
is assumed to be fixed. It is also assumed that, in the short-run, the 
number of shares of stock is fixed. Thus, dividends on stock can be 
treated as a constant. 
Retained savings 
The provisions for retained savings vary from state to state. Some 
states have no provisions for retained savings while others require 
cooperatives to add savings to their surplus accounts. Iowa law, for 
example, requires that at least 10 percent of net savings after income 
taxes must be added to surplus if the surplus account is equal to less 
than 30 percent of other member equity and that no additions can be made 
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if the surplus account is equal to more than 50 percent of other member 
equity. 
The typical case appears to be that of the cooperative which has a 
surplus account which is equal to less than 50 percent of other member 
equity. Most cooperatives have surplus accounts which are equal to less 
than 30 percent of other member equity. Of these, most add more than 10 
percent of their net savings after income taxes to the surplus account. 
Of those which have surplus accounts which are equal to more than 30 
percent of other member equity, most make additions to their surplus 
accounts. Many of them add more thciii 10 percent of their net savings 
after income taxes to the surplus account. 
Coffman [l4, p. 31"] reasons that since all net savings not allocated 
as patronage refunds are subject to income taxes, the best interests of 
both the cooperative and its members are served by minimizing retained 
savings. However, in light of the actual practices of cooperatives, it 
seems that the amount of net savings added to the surplus account is not 
determined by a legal restraint, but by an internal demand for capital. 
Because a discussion of financial decisions is beyond the scope of this 
study, it is assumed that the amount of net savings added to the surplus 
account of the cooperative in this model is determined outside of the 
model and is treated as a constant inside the model. 
Educational fund 
Some states require cooperatives to place some of their net savings 
into an educational fund. Iowa law, for example, requires that between 
one and five percent of net savings after income taxes must be added to 
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an educational fund. Since there is no economic advantage to the 
cooperatives of adding to their educational funds, most Iowa cooperatives 
add only the minimum required by law. Because most states do not require 
cooperatives to make additions to educational funds, an educational fund 
is not included in the analysis in this study. 
Income taxes 
The cooperative receives its earnings from two sources--member 
business and nonmember business. If the cooperative distributes net 
savings from nonmember business to its nonmember patrons in the same way 
it distributes net savings from member business to its member patrons, 
it may qualify for tax treatment under section 521 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954. Under section 521, a cooperative must pay tax on 
retained savings, but is not required to pay tax on patronage refunds, 
dividends on stock, and certain sources of income. 
A cooperative which does not operate under section 521 must pay 
taxes on all net savings not allocated as patronage refunds, but may 
restrict patronage refunds to members. Many cooperatives find it impos­
sible to comply with the strict provisions of section 521 or choose to pay 
taxes on the net savings on nonmember business so that the net savings 
from nonmember business can be used to add to the surplus account or to 
increase the amount of patronage refunds allocated to members. The only 
restriction placed on the use of the net savings from nonmember business 
by the cooperative is that it cannot be distributed to members through 
patronage refunds. Because it is the typical case, it is assumed that the 
cooperative in this study does not operate under section 521, Instead, 
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it does not pay patronage refunds to nonmember patrons and must pay 
income taxes on all net savings not allocated as patronage refunds. 
It is assumed that the cooperative must pay an income tax composed 
of a base sum b for that portion of its taxable incosa equal to an amount 
TI^ and an additional tax at a constant marginal rate t for that portion 
of its taxable income in excess of TI^. The cooperative's taxable in­
come is equal to its net savings less patronage refunds. Thus, its 
total tax bill is 
TX = b + t(NS - PR - TI^) (3.3) 
where NS is net savings and PR is patronage refunds and where the term 
within the parentheses is understood to be nonnegative.^ The marginal 
tax rate t is an effective rate which is a function of the state and 
federal rates. Because state taxes are deductible in computing federal 
taxes and because federal taxes may be deductible in part in computing 
state taxes, this rate is not simply the sum of the marginal rates for 
the state and federal taxes.^ 
Requirements 
In this Tpodei; dividends on stock, retained savings, and income 
taxes are requirements which must be met from net savings before patron­
age refunds can be allocated. A cooperative can elect to pay as much of 
these requirements as possible out of the net savings from nonmember 
business although it cannot distribute its net savings from nonmember 
^The total tax bill 3.3 can alternatively be stated: 
TX = t^(NS-PR-a^) + t.CNS-PR-a,) + tgCNS-PR-a^) + ... (3.3a) 
where a. is the value at which the increment t. is added to the marginal 
tax rate. As in 3.3, the terms within the parentheses are understood to 
be nonnegative. 
2 See Proof 5 in Appendix B for the derivation of the marginal rate t 
for a case in which state and federal taxes are fully deductible from 
each other. 
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business to its members through patronage refunds. In this way, the 
amount allocated as patronage refunds to the member patrons is to the 
greatest extent possible the net savings on the transactions between the 
cooperative and its members. 
Under this arrangement, the amount allocated as patronage refunds 
can be expressed: 
PR = NS - R (3.4) 
c 
where NS^ is the net savings from member business and R is: 
R = Req - NS^ ^  0. (3.5) 
Req is the sum of dividends on stock, retained savings, and income taxes: 
Req = DS + RS + TX, (3.6) 
and NS^ is the net savings from nonmember business. Substituting 3.5 
into 3.4, the amount allocated as patronage refunds can be expressed: 
PR = NS - Req. (3.7) 
Using 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5, 3.6 can be expressed: 
DS + RS + b-t • TI 
" (1 - t) * (3.8) 
Because all of the terms on the right-hand side of 3.8 are constants, 
Req is a constant. 
If the value of 3.8 is greater than the value of the savings from 
nonmember business, R > 0 and deductions to meet the requirements must be 
taken out of the net savings from member business of the departments in 
proportion to the patronage refunds (or net savings from member business) 
of the departments. Because the cooperative cannot distribute its net 
savings from nonmember business to its members through patronage refunds, 
it is assumed that Req is sufficiently large to ensure that R s 0. 
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Determination of Net Savings and Patronage Refunds 
Generally, for the purposes of accounting and management, the 
enterprises of a multi-product cooperative are divided into departments. 
For example, a cooperative might consist of a grain department; a feed 
department; a chemicals, fertilizer, and seed department; a petroleum 
products department; a building materials and ready mix department; and 
a merchandise department. 
The cooperative in this model is assumed to be organized into 
departments which purchase products in set X from patrons and use them 
in the production of products in set Z (marketing departments) and 
departments which produce products in set Y and sell them to patrons 
(supply departments). In this way, member patrons who sell products in 
set X to a marketing department receive patronage refunds on the net 
savings from the products in set Z which the department sells, and 
member patrons who purchase products in set Y from a supply department 
receive patronage refunds on the net savings from the products in set 
Y which the department sells. 
The net savings of each department is determined by subtracting the 
total cost of the department from the total revenue of the department. 
The total cost of operating a department may include payments to other 
departments for products purchased frotsa them and used in the production 
of the products marketed by the department. Similarly, the total revenue 
of a department may include receipts from other departments for sales to 
them. The exchange of products between departments is assumed to con­
form to the relationships indicated in Figure 3.1. 
Patrons Cooperative 
X 
( . . Y r 73 f 
/ 
.X 
Markets 
Figure 3.1. Flowc of products within the cooperative. 
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Products in set X, which are purchased from the patrons, are used to 
produce products in sets Y and Z. Products in set Z are sold to markets 
outside the cooperative association. Products in set Y are sold to the 
patrons and are used in the production of products in sets X, Z, and G. 
In addition, some products in set Y are used in the production of other 
products which are in set Y but in other departments. Finally, products 
in set V, which are purchased from markets outside the cooperative, and 
set are used in the production of products in sets Z, Y, and G. 
Thus, the net savings of the k-th marketing department can be 
expressed: 
NS, = I p.q. - Z p.(q. - S q..) - Z Z P.q.. 
jeZj^  : : jeY^  ieY iez^  
- r I p.q.. - 2 Z p.q.. - C (3.9a) 
iev jcz^ "-J iew^ jez^ 
where Z^ is the subset of products in set Z produced in the k-th depart­
ment, where X^ is the subset of products in set X purchased by the k-th 
dspsrtzezt, :-:here and are the price and quantity of the i-th 
product, where q^^ is the quantity of the i-th product or factor used in 
the production of the j-th product, and where is the amount of indi­
rect cost allocated to the k-th department. The symbol p^, for isW^, 
represents the price charged each department for the use of the i-th 
fixed factor. 
The net savings of the k-th supply department can similarly be 
expressed: 
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iev jsY^ iew^ jsY^ 
(3.9b) 
where is the subset of products in set Y produced in the k-th depart­
ment. 
Implicit in 3.9 is the assumption that trading between departments 
is done at market prices. For example, it is assumed that the petroleum 
products department charges the grain department the same price it 
charges its patrons for the gasoline the grain department uses in its 
operations. This seems to be the practice of most cooperatives. 
The net savings from member business of the k-th department is 
defined as the net savings of the k-th department multiplied by the pro­
portion of the total business of the department done with member patrons. 
Similarly, the net savings from nonmember business of the k-th depart­
ment is defined as the net savings of the k-th department multiplied by 
the proportion of the total business of the department done with non-
member patrons. 
The total net savings of the cooperative is determined by summing 
the net savings of the departments over all departments. It can be 
expressed: 
where FCC represents the total fixed costs of the cooperative. The total 
multiplied by the proportion of total business done with member patrons. 
NS = Z p.q. + Z P.q. - Z P.q. - S p.q. - FCC 
iez icY^ ieX^ ieV 
(3.10) 
net savings from member business, represented by NS^, is defined as NS 
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Similarly, the net savings from nonmember business, represented by NS^, 
is defined as NS multiplied by the proportion of total business done 
with nonmember patrons. 
Most cooperatives determine patronage refunds separately for each 
department. They reason that since operating costs and net savings vary 
from department to department and since individual members do not make 
equal use of all departments, departmental determination of patronage 
refunds is necessary to be fair to all members. 
In the method of determining per-unit patronage refunds used by 
most cooperatives, the per-unit patronage refund for the i-th product 
in department k is : 
fi = PkPi 
where p^ is the market price of the i-th product and: 
NSkc - *k 
_kç k (3.12) 
P q jeD^PjSjc 
where is the net savings from member business of department k, 
is the amount deducted from the net savings from member business of 
department k to meet the requirements in 3.8, and q^^ is the quantity of 
the j-th product in department k purchased or sold by the member patrons. 
is the subset if k is a marketing department and if k is a 
supply department. 
The cooperative or department which determines patronage refunds 
separately for each product can be treated as a set of departments, 
each of which consists of only one product. In that case, the method of 
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determining per-unit patronage refunds represented by 3.11 and 3.12 is 
equivalent to: 
= p^ - Vi - f^ (3.13) 
where is the average variable cost of producing product i and is 
the average fixed cost allocated to product i. At the other extreme, the 
case of the cooperative which determines one per-unit patronage refund 
for all products can be treated as a single department which includes 
all products. 
Some cooperatives may deviate from the method of determining patron­
age refunds represented by 3.11 and 3.12 when determining patronage 
refunds for a department which consists of products which are sold to 
patrons and which rely on products purchased from patrons as major in­
puts. An example of this type of product is mixed feed (set Y) which is 
produced by a cooperative by mixing finished grain (set Z) with protein 
(set V) and sold to patrons. 
If the cooperative utilized the method of determining patronage 
refunds represented by 3.11 and 3.12, member patrons who sold the grain 
(set X) used in the production of the mixed feed (set Y) would receive 
the net savings from the grain and the member patrons who purchased the 
mixed feed would receive the net savings from the mix. However, the 
member patrons who purchased the mixed feed would not participate at all 
in the net savings of the grain department since the feed department is 
assumed to purchase the finished grain at market prices. 
Because grain is a major input in the production of mixed feed, 
some cooperatives producing mixed feed allow member patrons who purchase 
74 
the mix to participate in the net savings of the grain department. This 
is done by giving them shares in the net savings of the grain department 
based on their purchases of mixed feed. These shares may be partial 
shares or full shares. Analysis of this type of situation is not in­
cluded in this study. 
Indirect Costs 
In this study, it is necessary to distinguish between variable and 
fixed costs. A variable cost is defined as the cost of a variable input, 
an input the quantity of which is variable in the short-run. A fixed 
cost is defined as the cost of a fixed input, an input the available 
quantity of which is not variable in the short-run. 
It is also necessary to distinguish between direct and indirect 
costs. A direct cost is defined as the cost of an input which is easily 
traceable to the production or marketing of a product or a segment of 
business. An indirect cost is defined as the cost of an input which is 
difficult to trace to a single product or segment because it is common 
to more than one. 
It is important to recognize that variable costs are not synonymous 
with direct costs and that fixed costs are not synonymous with indirect 
costs. Seme variable costs, such as institutional advertising expenses; 
are indirect costs in that they cannot be traced to a specific product 
or segment.^ On the other hand, some fixed costs, such as the 
"Institutional advertising is an example of a discretionary fixed 
cost. Holdren [30, p. 33] introduces the concept of discretionary fixed 
costs which he defines as "costs which are fixed with respect to output 
variation, but are decision variables within the functional time period 
known as the short run." 
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depreciation on a machine used in producing a single product, are direct 
costs in that they can be traced to a specific production segment. 
The salary of the general manager of a cooperative is a good example 
of an indirect or joint cost. Whereas the salaries of the assistant 
managers can easily be traced to the departments which they manage, the 
salary of the general manager cannot. 
Any multi-product cooperative can provide examples of indirect 
costs. The financial statements of one cooperative, for example, include 
meetings and travel, loss on disposal of fixed assets, telephone, 
utilities, insurance, bad debts, interest, advertising, and miscellaneous 
expenses as indirect costs. In addition, they include some salaries and 
NYTCO (bonding) expenses, payroll taxes, retirement and insurance, depre­
ciation, property taxes, pest control,^ truck expense, data processing,^ 
general and administrative,^ OSHA. expense,^ audit and legal,^ directors' 
fees,^ organization costs, dues and subscriptions,^ and donations^ as 
allocated to the administrative department. These expenses are indirect 
costs in that the costs of operating the administrative department can­
not be easily traced to each of the other departments. 
The cooperative must assign its indirect costs to its departments 
so that the net savings of the departments can be determined. The assign­
ment of the indirect costs is important in that the patronage refunds of 
each department are determined by the net savings of the department. 
Indirect costs can be assigned to departments by several methods. 
First, the cooperative can arbitrarily assign indirect costs to the 
^Expenses allocated exclusively to the administrative department. 
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departments before making its decisions on prices and outputs. These 
prior cost allocations are pre-determined parameters which may affect 
decisions on prices and outputs but which are not affected by them. 
Second, the cooperative can assign indirect costs to the depart­
ments through a basis approach. In a basis approach, an attempt is made 
to allocate indirect costs among the departments according to the bene­
fits which they receive from the common cost factors. Because there is 
no way to directly determine how much a particular department benefits 
from the common cost factors, indirect costs are allocated among the 
departments by relating them to some other cost factor or basis which can 
be directly identified with units of output. A cooperative may, for 
example, allocate indirect costs among its departments in proportion to 
sales or in proportion to particular direct costs. 
If it is to be assumed that the basis selected measures the benefits 
received from the common cost factors, it should, to the greatest extent 
possible, be related to their services. However, it should be recognized 
that any basis by which indirect costs are allocated is necessarily an 
arbitrary one even if it is a reasonable one. 
Ladd [37] offers an instrument approach as a third alternative for 
allocating indirect costs to departments. In the instrument approach, 
decisions on the allocation of indirect costs are made simultaneously 
with decisions on prices and outputs, and the cost allocations, as well 
as the prices or levels of outputs, serve as instruments for achieving 
the cooperative's objectives. 
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It is assumed that there are three types of costs in this model. 
First, there are direct costs which are assumed to be assigned to the 
departments corresponding to the products to which they are traceable. 
These costs are represented in 3.9 as the terms with double summation 
signs and include direct fixed costs. 
Second, there are direct departmental costs, costs which are 
defined here to be costs which cannot be easily traced to specific 
products but which car be easily traced to specific departments. As 
with direct costs, these costs are assumed to be assigned to the 
departments to which they can be traced. This is in accordance to the 
principle of service at cost. 
Finally, there are the indirect departmental costs, costs which are 
defined to be costs which cannot be easily traced to specific depart­
ments. Because any assignment of these costs would be arbitrary, use of 
the instrument method in allocating them does not violate the principle 
of service at cost. 
Thus, the amount of indirect costs allocated to the k-th department 
can be expressed: 
" Sk ^Ik (3.14) 
where represents the amount of direct departmental costs allocated 
to the k-th department and where represents the amount of indirect 
departmental costs allocated to it. The total amount of indirect 
departmental costs allocated must equal the total indirect departmental 
cost Cj, which includes the cost of providing the public goods: 
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= I "iv 
For the purpose of cost allocation, is a constant. 
Constraints 
The objective function 3.1 which the cooperative is assumed to 
maximize is subject to several constraints. First, there is the produc­
tion function, represented by 3.2. Second, there is a set of constraints 
which ensure use of each fixed factor does not exceed the stock of the 
factor in possession of the cooperative. If the quantity of the i-th 
fixed factor used in the production of the j-th product by the coopera­
tive is represented by q^^ and the stock of the factor is represented by 
q^, the i-th such constraint can be expressed: 
Z ^ ^iO* (3.16) 
jeG,Y^,z 
Finally, there is a constraint which places a limit on the propor­
tion of the cooperative's business which is done with nonmembers. The 
Capper-Volstead Act stipulates that a cooperative must not deal with 
nonmembers to an extent exceeding one-half of the value of business done. 
This constaint can be expressed: 
a ^ a (3.17) 
o 
where ~ represents the maximum proportion of ncnmember business allowed 
by law and where : 
ieC 
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where is the quantity of the i-th product bought or sold by non-
members and q^ is the total quantity of the i-th product bought or sold. 
Lagrangian Function 
The objective of the cooperative is to maximize the total profits 
of its member patrons subject to constraints 3.2, 3.16, and 3.17. Maxi­
mization of the total profits of the member patrons (TMP) is equivalent 
to maximizing the sum of the total private profits of the member patrons 
(TPP) and the total collective profits of the member patrons (TCP). The 
total private profits of the member patrons are defined as the differ­
ence between the total private revenues of the member patrons (TPR), or 
the sum of the total revenues of the member patrons exclusive of patron­
age refunds, and the total private costs of the member patrons (TPC), 
or the sum of the total costs of the member patrons. 
The total collective profits of the member patrons are defined as 
the difference between the total collective revenues of the member 
patrons (TCR), or the total revenue of the cooperative multiplied by 
s + (l-s)/(l+d^)^, and the total collective costs of the member patrons 
(TCC), or the total cost of the cooperative multiplied by s + (1-s)/ 
f (1+d^) . The symbol d^ represents the cooperative's discount rate. The 
cooperative decision-maker may attempt to set the value of this equal to 
d, the discount rate of the typical member patron, or he may determine 
a subjective value which takes into consideration the use of deferred 
patronage refunds in the cooperative. The total revenue and total cost of 
the cooperative are multiplied by s + (1-s)/(1+d^)^ because they affect 
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the total profits of the member patrons through allocated patronage 
refunds. 
The total collective profits of the cooperative are equal to the 
total net savings of the cooperative multiplied by s + (l-s)/(l+d^)^ . 
Thus, the Lagrangian function corresponding to the problem of the 
cooperative can be expressed: 
L = s - S P q. + [s + ]ss 
isx ^ ieY (l+d^f 
+ Xj * ^ (Qz' ^ Y' ^G' ^X' ^ 
c 
+ S X-.Cq-n - 2 q,J+X-.[a-a] (3.19) 
iew^ jeG,Y^,z 
where the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the production 
function 3.2, the are the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the 
fixed-factor constraints 3.16, and Xg is the Lagrange multiplier corre­
sponding to the nonmember-bus ine s s constraint 3.17. 
Kunn-iucKer uonaicions 
Among the instruments available to the cooperative are the prices 
it sets for the products in set C and the quantities of the products in 
sets G and Z which it produces. The quantities of each of the variable 
inputs in set V and of each of the fixed factors in set which the 
cooperative uses in the production of each of the products in sets G, 
Y^, and Z are also instruments available to it. In general, it is 
assumed that the price of a product in set Z may vary inversely with the 
quantity of the product sold by the cooperative and that the price of a 
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product in set V may vary directly with the quantity of the input pur­
chased by the cooperative. 
The decisions of the cooperative are assumed to be made in two 
stages. In the first stage, the prices of the products in set C, the 
quantities of the products in sets G and Z, and the quantities of the 
inputs in sets V and used in the production of each of the products 
in sets G, Y^, and Z are determined. These values determine the volumes 
of business and the total net savings of the cooperative. 
In the second stage, the addition to surplus, the indirect cost 
allocations, and the patronage refunds are determined. Although it is 
assumed that the cooperative in this model has perfect knowledge of the 
marginal cost, supply, and demand functions for the current period, it 
is assumed that it does not know what its total revenues and total costs 
are until the end of the accounting period. Thus, it must wait until 
the end of the accounting period to determine its net savings, its 
addition to surplus, and its patronage refunds. The values of the 
patronage refunds for the various products are contingent upon the 
indirect cost allocations which are also made in this second stage. 
Corresponding to the instruments and the Lagrangian function 3.19 
is a set of Kuhn-Tucker conditions. These are necessary conditions for 
a global maximum. They are sufficient conditions for a global maximum 
if the objective function is concave, the constraints are concave, and 
the set of feasible solutions is bounded and nonempty. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the problem represented by 3.19 are 
as follows : 
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for all jgX^: 
ak- = q._ + Ï P.. ^  - S P.. ^  + [s + asic 
SPj jc isx i ^Pj isY i ^Pj (1+dc) 
5q,-
Scr 
- 3^ â;: : ° (3.20a) 
• "J = ° 
p. ^  0 
J 
(3.20b) 
(3.20c) 
for all jeY^: 
^ = 
ÔP. 
ô^ic Sq, 
" 'jc * iGx'i aPj "isY^i aPj 
1Ç + [s + (1-s) 3 
(l+d_)T 
3q. 3q. ôq-
 ^ à;:- " je M,  ^1 J 
OC 
- ^3 ^  ^ ° (3.21a) 
Ifc • "j ° ° 
p. s 0 
J 
(3.21b) 
(3.21c) 
for all jeG; 
aq, 
at- . z p. !ÏL= 
iex ^ ieY "• 3%] 
S P, ^ - [s + 
(l+df) 
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% - J./'i:c 
% ' "j ' ° 
q. s 0 
J 
for all jeZ: 
% - j -
q. ^  0 
J 
for all ieV; jeG, Y^, Z: 
-.j n- —^ 
h~^"^± i ' °  
qy ^  0 
for all igW^; jsG, Y^, Z: 
' '*1 • • 
"»ij = " 
(3.22a) 
(3.22b) 
(3.22c) 
(3.23a) 
(3.23b) 
(3.23c) 
(3.24a) 
(3.24b) 
(3.24c) 
(3.25a) 
(3.25b) 
(3.25c) 
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for X^: 
Qy' ^ G' %' % ^ 
1 c 
= 0 (3.26) 
for Xgi' isW^: 
^ = q 
3\o ^iO . 
Z q.. a 0 
2, j e G ,Y ,z 
(3.27a) 
ak. 
aXgi 2i 
^21 > 0 
Xo,- - 0 (3.27b) 
(3.27c) 
for Xg: 
(3.28a) 
aXg ' ^3 0 
X3 s 0. 
(3.28b) 
(3.28c) 
No attempt is made in this chapter to interpret these conditions. 
That task is reserved for the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV. ANALYSIS 
Interpretation of Lagrange Multipliers 
Before the Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be interpreted, it is neces­
sary to interpret the Lagrange multipliers. It should be repeated that, 
in general, the value of a Lagrange multiplier at a solution indicates 
how much the value of the objective function will change given a one-
unit change in the corresponding constraint constant. Thus, can be 
interpreted as the imputed value or shadow price of the i-th fixed 
factor: 
It indicates how much the profits of the member patrons would increase 
with an increase in the i-th fixed factor available. 
Similarly, the value of the Lagrange multiplier indicates how 
the profits of the member patrons would increase with a one-unit change 
in the maximum proportion of nonmember business allowed by law: 
= |S 2 0. (4.2) 
A change in the j-th price or a change in the quantity of the j-th public 
good provided by the cooperative may affect the proportion of the coop-
ative's business which is done with nonmembers as iadicated by the 
partial derivative ôa^/ôp^ for jeC or the partial derivative ôc^/ôqj 
for jsG. If the nonmember-business constraint 3.20 is binding, a 
change in the proportion of the cooperative's business done with 
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nomnembers caused by a change in the j-th public good provided by the 
cooperative must be offset by another change. 
Thus, the product (ScJ^/ôp.) for jeC represents the marginal vari­
ation in the profits of the member patrons arising from the change in 
the ratio of nonmember business to total business which is induced by a 
variation in p^. Similarly, the product for jeG represents 
the marginal variation in the profits of the member patrons arising from 
the change in the ratio of nonmember business to total business which is 
induced by a variation in q^. Depending upon the signs of ôc^/ôp^ for 
jeC and ôQ^/ôq. for jeG and whether the value of is zero or positive, 
XsCôao/ôPj) for jeC and X^^^CT^/ôq^) for jeG may be positive, negative, 
or zero in value. 
The same difficulties which arose in the interpretation of for 
the typical member patron arise in the interpretation of X^ for the 
cooperative. Under certain conditions, it is possible to mathemati­
cally demonstrate that at a maximum -X^(ô^/ôq^) for an output i is 
equal to the marginal variation in the profits of the member patrons 
arising from a change in the quantity of the output produced by the 
cooperative and that Xj^Cô^/ôq^) for an input i is equal to the marginal 
variation in the profits of the member patrons arising from a change in 
the quantity of the input used in production by the cooperative.^ 
See Proofs 3 and 4 in Appendix B. Although the appendix only 
contains proofs for an input in set and an output in set a 
corresponding proof can easily be perrormed for any other input or 
output by using similar logic. 
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There is a considerable difference between the interpretation of 
for an output i as the marginal variation in the profits of 
the member patrons arising from a change in the quantity of the output 
produced by the cooperative and the interpretation of -'Ï^O$/ôq^) for 
an output i as the marginal cost of producing the output in the case of 
the typical member patron« The marginal variation in the profits of 
the member patrons arising from a change in the quantity of output i 
produced by the cooperative includes the effect on the profits of the 
member patrons of the change in the quantities of the inputs used by the 
cooperative in producing the output, the effect on the profits of the 
member patrons of the change in the ratio of nonmember business to total 
business resulting from the change in the quantities of the inputs used 
by the cooperative in producing the output, and the marginal opportunity 
cost of using fixed factors of production.^ 
Similarly, there is a considerable difference between the inter­
pretation of X^(ô$/ôq^) for an input i as the marginal variation in the 
profits of the member patrons arising from a change in the quantity of 
the input used in production by the cooperative and the interpretation 
of Y^(ô0/ôq^) for an input i as the marginal revenue (value) product of 
the input in the case of the typical member patron. The marginal varia­
tion in the profits of the member patrons arising from a change in the 
quantity of input i used in production by the cooperative includes the 
effect on the profits of the member patrons of the change in the 
"These effects are considered in Proof 3 through the inclusion of 
the terms in A.19. 
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quantities of the outputs produced by the cooperative and the effect on 
the profits of the member patrons of the change in the ratio of nonmember 
business to total business resulting from the change in the quantities of 
the outputs produced by the cooperative.^ 
General Model 
After the interpretation of the Lagrange multipliers, it is possible 
to begin interpreting the Kuhn-Tucker conditions represented by 3.20 
through 3.28. As with the patron sub-models, whenever there is a set of 
an (a), (b), and (c) condition, the (c) condition requires that the 
instrument to which the conditions correspond must be nonnegative. In 
most cases, it will be useful to assume that the value of the instrument 
is positive. If this is so, the (b) condition guarantees that the (a) 
condition is satisfied as an equality. 
If the cooperative offers a positive price for the j-th product in 
set X , condition 3.20a is satisfied as an equality and can be rewritten: 
 ^  ^- J/i if " 
âp. ôq. ôq. ôq. ^9. 
ap. + ^ 'i 5;:^ + H à;: 
ôa 
- Xq — = 0 for ail jeX . (4.3) 
J dPj c 
^These effects are considered in Proof 4 through the inclusion of 
the terms in A.28. 
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The partial derivatives ôq. /3p. and ôq./ôp., where jeX , are deter-
I C  J  1 J  ,c 
mined by summing the slopes of the individual supply or demand functions 
across the member patrons and all patrons, respectively. The slopes of 
the typical member patron's supply and demand functions with respect to 
changes in the j-th price, jeX^, are represented by 2.54, in which k=i 
and l=j. 
The term p.+q. Op./ôq. ) can be interpreted as the marginal varia-
J J(- J Op­
tion in total private revenues from the j-th product. Thus, [p^+q^^ 
Op./ôq. )] ôq. /ôp. can be interpreted as the marginal variation in 
J  jc J C  J  
total private revenues from the j-th product arising from output shifts 
which are induced by a variation in the j-th price (dp^). This effect 
can be represented by (ôTPR/ôq. )(ôq. /Bp.). The term Z p.(Bq. /ôp.) 
JC JC J igx 1 ic J 
ifj 
can be interpreted as the marginal variation in total private revenues 
from all other products in set X arising from output shifts which are 
induced by dp,. This effect can be represented by % OTPR/Bq. ) 
- isX ic 
i^j 
Oq. /ôp.). Similarly, the term Z p.(ôq. /ôp.) can be interpreted as 
ic J igY ^ J 
the marginal variation in total private costs arising from shifts in 
factor use which are induced by dp^. This effect can be represented by 
Z OTPC/aq )0q /ÔP ). 
isY j 
Letting s' represent s + (l-s)/(l+d^)^, the term s' [p^ + q^ 
(SPj/Bqj)] can be interpreted as the marginal variation in total 
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collective costs from the j-th product.^ Thus, s'[Pj + q^CSp^/ôq^)] can 
be interpreted as the marginal variation in total collective costs from 
the j-th product arising from changes in the quantities supplied which 
are induced by dpy. This effect can be represented by OTCC/ôq^) 
(ôq./3p.). The term s ' S p.fôq./ôp.) can be interpreted as the marginal 
J J isX ^ ^ J 
variation in total collective costs from all other products in set 
arising from changes in the quantities supplied which are induced by dp^. 
This effect can be represented by S (ôTCC/ôq.)(ôq./âp.). Similarly, 
ieX 1 1 J 
the term s' 2 p.(ôq./ôp.) can be interpreted as the marginal variation 
isY 1 ^ 
c 
in total collective revenues from the products in set arising from 
changes in the quantities demanded which are induced by dpy. This effect 
can be represented by 2 (âTCR/ôq.)(ôq./ôp.). 
ieY 1 1 J 
c 
In the discussion of the Lagrange multipliers, -Xi(B$/5q.) for an 
output i was interpreted as the marginal variation in the profits of the 
member patrons arising from a change in the quantity of the output 
1 T The existence of the term s + (1-s) (1+d ) in the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions suggests a possible conflict between short-run and long-run 
objectives or between member patrons and the cooperative decision-maker. 
Maximization of the profits of the member patrons including the present 
value of patronage refunds is not the same as maximization of the 
profits of the member patrons including the cash value of patronage 
refunds. A change from the former to the latter might result in more 
of the profits of the member patrons taking the form of patronage 
refunds. This would result in more capital for long-run investment. 
A second source of conflict is the amount of retained savings, RS in 
3.6. The differences between short-run and long-run objectives are not 
examined here. They involve decisions on investment and financing and 
are beyond the scope of this study. 
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produced by the cooperative. Thus, the term - S X,(ô$/ôq.)Oq./ôp.) 
ieY 1 1 J 
c 
can be interpreted as the marginal variation in the profits of the 
member patrons from the production of the products in set arising from 
changes in the quantities demanded which are induced by dpy. This effect 
can be represented by S (ôTMP/ôq.)(ôq./ôp.). Similarly, X,(ô$/ôq.) for 
i e Y  1  1  J 1 1  
c  
an input i was interpreted as the marginal variation in the profits of 
the member patrons arising from a change in the quantity of the input 
used in production by the cooperative. Thus, E (ô$/Bq.) (ôq./ôp.) 
isX ^ ^ 
c 
can be interpreted as the marginal variation in the profits of the 
member patrons from the use in production of the products in set 
arising from changes in the quantities supplied which are induced by 
dp.. This effect can be represented by S (ôTMP/ôq.)Oq./ôp.). 
^ ieX 1 1 J 
c 
The term was interpreted as the marginal variation in 
the profits of the member patrons arising from the change in the ratio 
of nonmember business to total business which is induced by dp.. This 
effect can be represented by (ôTMP/ôa^)(ôa^/ôp^). 
Thus, if the cooperative offers a positive price for the j-th 
product in set X^, the following equality must be satisfied for a 
maximum: 
, snS: _ y STPç SSjc. , arçR . y arçç 
ieX ieY isY^^^i ieX^ ^"^i 
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BTîff _ V mm _ âzî® = 0 
icX^ ieY^ 
for ail jeX^. (4.4) 
This is equivalent to stating that, for a maximum, the sum of the 
marginal variation in total private profits arising from input and out­
put shifts induced by dp^; the marginal variation in total collective 
profits arising from changes in the quantities supplied and demanded 
induced by dp^; the marginal variation in the profits of the member 
patrons arising from changes in the cooperative's production induced by 
dpj; and the marginal variation in the profits of the member patrons 
arising from the change in the ratio of nonmember business to total 
business induced by dp^ must equal zero. 
Condition 4.4 is more complicated than the analogous condition for 
the proprietary firm. In general, the optimality condition correspond­
ing to 4.4 for the proprietary firm contains two sets of revenue and 
cost terms - one set associated with the sales and purchases (market 
activities) of the firm, the other associated with the production 
activities of the firm.^ Terms analogous to these appear within the 
second and third sets of parentheses in 4.4. 
^For example, Holdren [30, p. 127] presents an optimality condition 
for the retail firm which can be rewritten: 
s I ^ = 0 (4.5) 
i=l ^^i i=l ^^i 
where n is the number of products sold and where TR and TC represent 
the firm's total revenue and total cost, respectively. The revenue terms 
correspond to the market activities of the firm and the cost terms corre­
spond to the production activities of the firm. 
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However, because the cooperative attempts to maximize the sum of 
total private profits and total collective profits of its member patrons, 
the optimality condition for the cooperative also includes a set of 
revenue and cost terms corresponding to the market activities of the 
member patrons. These are represented by the terms within the first 
set of parentheses in 4.4. In addition, 4.4 includes the term represent­
ing the marginal variation in the profits of the member patrons arising 
from the change in the ratio of norunember business to total business 
which is induced by dp^. 
The purchase by member patrons of products in set from the 
cooperative affects total collective revenues as well as total private 
costs. Similarly, the sales by member patrons of products in set to 
the cooperative affects total collective costs as well as total private 
revenues. If the proportion of the patronage refunds allocated which 
are paid in the current period is equal to one (s=l) or if the coopera­
tive sets its discount rate equal to zero (d^=0), these effects cancel 
each other out and 4.4 can be rewritten: 
/ V îliç _ y arpç f2iç. , „ âlÇR 
iex^ ^ ^ic ieY^ ^ \c isY^ ^^io 
ÔTÇÇ 5TMP ^  _ 5TMP ^  
ieX^ ^°io ieX^ ^ ^i igY^ ^ ^i 
- = 0 for ail jeX (4.6) 
Bp. c 
where is the subset of products in set X which are produced by the 
member patrons and sold outside the cooperative association and where Y^ 
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is the subset of products in set Y which are purchased by the member 
patrons from outside the cooperative association. The interpretation of 
4.6 is identical to that of 4.4 except that the marginal variation in 
total private profits arising from member patron input and output shifts 
is limited to that from products purchased from sellers or sold to 
buyers outside the cooperative association and that the marginal varia­
tion in total collective costs arising from changes in the quantities 
supplied and demanded is limited to that from the quantities supplied or 
demanded by nonmember patrons. 
If in addition to assuming that s = 1 or d^ = 0, it is assumed that 
the cooperative does not do business with nonmembers, 4.4 reduces to: 
arPR 22iç _ y STPÇ ^ iç. , ^2iç 
icX^^^ic ieY^^^ic ieX^^^ic 
- Z = 0 for ail jcX . (4.7) 
isY^aSic aPj 
This is equivalent to stating that, for a maximum, the sum of the marginal 
variation in total private profits arising from input and output shifts 
(in the quantities of the products the member patrons purchase from 
sellers or sell to buyers outside the cooperative association) induced 
by dpj and the marginal variation in the profits of the member patrons 
arising from changes in the cooperative's production induced by dp. must 
equal zero. 
Interpretation of condition 3.21a is very similar to that of condi­
tion 3.20a. If the cooperative charges a positive price for the j-th 
product in set Y^, condition 3.21a is satisfied as an equality and can 
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be rewritten: 
i9^j 
d Sp ôq Ôq 
M/ ^Pj - ^ 
3q. ôq. ôa„ 
% ^ Y P i s ;:T + 
i#j = 
for all jeY^. (4.8) 
The partial derivatives ôq. /ôp. and ôq./ôp., where isY , are determined 
ic J 1 J c 
by summing the slopes of the individual supply or demand functions across 
the member patrons and all patrons, respectively. The slopes of the 
typical member patron's supply and demand functions with respect to 
changes in the j-th price, jeY^, are represented by 2.55, in which k = i 
and 1 = j. 
The term D. + o. (ÔD./OQ. ) can be interpreted as the marginal 
*J "jc -J -jc 
variation in total private costs from the j-th product. Thus, [p^ + q^^ 
(ôp./ôq. )] ôq. /ôp. can be interpreted as the marginal variation in to-
J JC jC J 
tal private costs from the j-th product arising from shifts in factor use 
which are induced by dp.. This effect can be represented by (ôTEC/ôq^^) 
(qjg/ôPj). 
The term s' [p^ + qjCôp^/ôqj)] can be interpreted as the marginal 
variation in total collective revenues from the j-th product. Thus, 
s ' [pj + q^(ôpy'ôq^)] ôq^/ôPj can be interpreted as the marginal varia­
tion in total collective revenues from the j-th product arising from 
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changes in the quantities demanded which are induced by dp^. This effect 
can be represented by (ôTCR/ôq^)(ôq^/ôp^). 
All other terms in 4.8 appear in 4.3 and have the same interpreta­
tions as they did in 4.3. Thus, if the cooperative charges a positive 
price for the j-th product in set in Y^, 4.4 for jeY^ must be satisfied 
for a maximum. It has the same interpretation as it did for jeX^. 
Expressions analogous to 4.6 and 4.7 can be derived for jsY^. However, 
because of the degree of similarity between 4.3 and 4.8, they are not 
presented here. 
If the cooperative produces a positive quantity of the j-th public 
good in set G, condition 3.22a is satisfied as an equality. The partial 
derivatives Bqu^/Sq^ and Bq^/3q., where jsG, are determined by summing 
the slopes of the individual supply or demand functions across the 
member patrons and all patrons, respectively. The slopes of the typical 
member patron's supply and demand functions with respect to changes in 
the j-th public good are represented by 2.58, in which k = i and 1 = j. 
The term Z p.Oq. /3q.) can be interpreted as the marginal varia-
ieX 1 J 
tion in total private revenues from all products in set X arising from 
output shifts which are induced by a variation in the level of the j-th 
public good (dq.). This effect can be represented by S (ôTPR/ôq. ) 
^ ieX 
Oa. /ôq.). Similarly, the term S p.Oq. /&q.) can be interpreted as 
-ic -J igY " ^ 
the marginal variation in total private costs from all products in set 
Y arising from shifts in factor use which are induced by dq^. This effect 
can be represented by E OTPC/ôq. )(ôq. /3q.). 
-_v J 
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The term s' Z p.Oq./ôq.) can be interpreted as the marginal 
ieX ^ J 
c 
variation in total collective costs from the products in arising from 
changes in the quantities supplied which are induced by dq^. This effect 
can be represented by S (ôTCC/ôq.)Oq./ôq.). Similarly, the term 
ieX X 1 J 
c 
s' I p.(3q./ôq.) can be interpreted as the marginal variation in total 
isY 1 ^ J 
c 
collective revenues from the products in arising from changes in the 
quantities demanded which are induced by dq^, This effect can be 
represented by Z (ôTCR/ôq.)(ôq./ôq.). 
ieY_ ^ J 
From the discussion of the Lagrange multipliers, for an 
output i can be interpreted as the marginal variation in the profits of 
the member patrons arising from a change in the quantity of the output 
produced by the cooperative. For i = j, this effect can be represented 
by (ôTMP/ôq.). The term - Z (ô$/ôq.)(ôq./ôq.) can be interpreted as 
J isY 1 1 1 j 
c 
the marginal variation in the profits of the member patrons from the 
production of products in set Y^ arising from changes in the quantities 
demanded which are induced by dq.. This effect can be represented by 
Z (ôTMP/ôq.) Oq./3q.) . Similarly, X^(ô$/ôq.) for an input i can be 
ieY 1 1 J il
c 
interpreted as the marginal variation in the profits of the member 
patrons arising from a change in the quantity of the input used in 
production by the cooperative. Thus, S X, Oî'/ôq.) Oq./ôq.) can be 
isX j 
c 
interpreted as the marginal variation in the profits of the member 
patrons from the use in production of products in set arising from 
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changes in the quantities supplied which are induced by dq^. This effect 
can be represented by T, (ôTMP/ôq.) Oq./ôq .) . 
ieX 1 1 J 
c 
The term XgCSOg/oqj) was interpreted as the marginal variation in 
the profits of the member patrons arising from the change in the ratio 
of nonmember business to total business which is induced by dq^. This 
effect can be represented by (ôTMP/ôa^)(ôa^/ôq^). 
Thus, if the cooperative provides a positive quantity of the j-th 
public good, the following equality must be satisfied for a maximum: 
. „ âTPR S^ic _ 3TPC „ ÔTCR ^^i 
V  ^T:— T: - E r" ) + l z 
ieX igY isY^ ^ ^i ""j 
5TCC BTMP , STMP ^  _ 5TMP ^  
ieX^ ^ ^i ieX^ ^^i ieY^ ^ ^i 
- ^ = 0 for all jsG. (4.9) 
BOo aqj 
This is equivalent to stating that, for a maximum, the sum of the 
marginal variation in total private profits arising from input and out­
put shifts induced by dq^; the marginal variation in total collective 
profits arising from changes in the quantities supplied and demanded 
induced by q^; the marginal variation in the profits of the member 
patrons arising from changes in the cooperative's production induced by 
dq^ (including dq^ itself); and the marginal variation in the profits of 
the member patrons arising from the change in the ratio of nonmember 
business to total business induced by dq^ must equal zero. 
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It is apparent from 4.9 that if the j-th public good is a non­
excludable public good, its effect on nonmember patrons must be taken 
into consideration in the determination of the optimal level of the public 
good. If the public good is an excludable public good and nonmember 
patrons are excluded from using it, 4.9 can be rewritten: 
X _ y BTPÇ + ( y 5TCR ^"^ic 
iex ^^ic ieY ^^ic ieY^ ^^i 
aTcc + aTMP ^  . BTMP ^^ic _ BTMP ^^ic. 
isXg ^^i ieX^ ^'^i isY^ 
- ^ = 0 for ail jcG. (4.10) 
The interpretation of 4.10 is identical to that of 4.9 except that the 
marginal variation in total collective profits arising from changes in 
the quantities supplied and demanded and the marginal variation in the 
profits of the member patrons arising from changes in the cooperative's 
production is limited to that from quantities supplied or demanded by 
member patrons. 
The marginal variation in the profits of the member patrons arising 
from the change in the ratio of nonmember business to total business in­
duced by q^ remains in 4.10 because the level of the j-th public good 
can affect che ratio through the quantities supplied and demanded by 
member patrons. If the cooperative does not serve nonmember patrons, 
this effect would be absent from 4.10. 
If it is assumed that the cooperative does not serve nonmembers and 
that s = 1 or d =0,4.9 reduces to: 
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, STPR _ 5TPC STMP , STMP 
icX^ ieY^ ^^2  ieXg 
- S liÇ) = 0 for all jeG. (4.11) 
ieY^ a^ic 
This is equivalent to stating that, for a maximum, the sum of the marginal 
variation in total private profits arising from input and output shifts 
(in the quantities of the products the member patrons purchase from 
sellers or sell to buyers outside the cooperative association) induced by 
dq^ and the marginal variation in the profits of the member patrons 
arising from changes in the cooperative's production induced by dq^ 
(including dq^ itself) must equal to zero. This is similar to the 
interpretation given to 4.7 for dp^, jeX^. 
If the cooperative produces a positive quantity of the j-th product 
in set Z, condition 3.23a is satisfied as an equality. The term p^ + q^ 
(SPj/^Qj) is the marginal revenue to the cooperative from the j-th 
product. Again J from the discussion of the Lagrange multipliers, 
-\j^(ô$/ôqj) for an output j can be interpreted as the marginal variation 
in the profits of the member patrons arising from a change in the 
quantity of the output produced by the cooperative (dq^). Thus, 3.23a 
is equivalent to stating that, for a maximum, the marginal revenue to 
the cooperative, multiplied by s + (l-s)/(l+d^)^, must equal the marginal 
variation in the profits of the member patrons arising from dq^. 
If the cooperative uses a positive quantity of the i-th variable 
input in set V in the production of the j-th product in set G, Y^, or Z, 
condition 3.24a is satisfied as an equality. The term p^ + q^^3p^/3q^) 
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is the marginal factor cost to the cooperative of using the i-th variable 
input. The term can be interpreted as the marginal variation 
in the profits of the member patrons from a change in the quantity of 
input i used in the production of output j by the cooperative (dq_). 
Thus, 3.24a is equivalent to stating that, for a maximum, the marginal 
variation in the profits of the member patrons from dq.^ must equal the 
marginal factor cost to the cooperative of using the input, multiplied by 
s + (l-s)/(l+d^)^. Obviously, this result implies that the marginal 
variation in the profits of the member patrons from dq^^ must be equal 
for all j for a maximum. 
If the cooperative uses a positive quantity of the i-th fixed input 
in set in the production of the j-th product in set G, Y^, or Z, 
condition 3.25a is satisfied as an equality. Again, the term X^(ô$/ôq^j) 
can be interpreted as the marginal variation in the profits of the member 
patrons from a change in the quantity of input i used in the production 
of output j by the cooperative. From the discussion of the Lagrange 
multipliers, can be interpreted as the imputed value or shadow price 
to the member patrons of the i-th fixed factor. Thus, 3.25a is equiva­
lent to stating that, for a maximum, the marginal variation in the 
profits of the member patrons from dq^^ must equal the imputed value to 
the cooperative of the factor. Again, this result implies that the 
marginal variation in the profits of the member patrons from dq^^ must 
be equal for all j for a maximum. 
Condition 3.26 is simply a restatement of the cooperative's produc­
tion function. Conditions 3.27a throu^ 3.27c correspond to the 
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cooperative's fixed-factor constraints 3.16. Their interpretation is 
similar to that given to the corresponding conditions 2.13a through 2.13c 
for the typical member patron as represented by 2.21a and 2.21b. 
Conditions 3.28a through 3.28c correspond to the nonmember-business 
constraint 3.17. Condition 3.28a is a restatement of 3.17. Condition 
3.28c requires that the value of must be nonnegative. If the value 
of is positive, condition 3.28b guarantees that 3.28a is an equality. 
If 3.28a is satisfied as a strict inequality, i.e., if there is slack in 
the nonmember business constraint, 3.28b guarantees that is equal to 
zero. 
For most agricultural cooperatives, it is expected that the non-
member-business constraint will not be binding. Generally only coopera­
tives which sell petroleum products in metropolitan areas and coopera­
tives operating under section 521 of the Internal Revenue Code might be 
expected to have binding nonmember-business constraints. Thus, in 
general, the marginal variation in the profits of the member 
patrons arising from the change in the ratio of nonmember business to 
total business which is induced by a variation in a price or in the 
quantity of a public good are equal to zero. 
It is apparent that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions 3.20 through 3.28 
are very complex^ In addition, there is a great amount of information 
which is necessary to evaluate them. Among the values which the 
cooperative decision-maker must know are: 
ôq. zap. ieX, Y 
^ jcc 
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3q. /Bp. ieC 
^ jec 
^1 
ieC, G, Z 
^3 
ôa^/ôPj j€C 
âq,-^/9q^ isx, Y 
" ^ jcG 
ôq./ôq . ieC 
^ is G 
acq/aqj jec 
spi/sq^ isz, V 
a*/aq.j iev, 
jeG, Y^, z 
Xji ie"^. 
This suggests that the cooperative decision-maker's task of maximizing 
the profits of the cooperative's member patrons is a difficult one. In 
fact, it is doubtful that a cooperative of any complexity will be able 
to fully attain the objective of maximizing the profits of its member 
patrons. 
Nevertheless, the optimality conditions presented here should be 
of value to the cooperative which is attempting to maximize its member 
patrons' profits even if it is not entirely successful in doing sc. 
Further insight into these conditions is provided by considering the 
simplified models which follow. One result is immediate. Because of 
the interrelationships between the variables in this model, insistence 
on the principle that price must equal or exceed average total cost for 
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every service (service at cost, i.e., there cannot be loss-leaders) may 
conflict with the optimality conditions presented here, thus leading to 
a lower than optimal value of the objective function. 
Single-Product Marketing Cooperative 
In this model, the cooperative markets a product produced by single-
product member and nonmember patrons. This product is used by the 
cooperative in the production of several outputs, each of which is sold 
outside the cooperative association. The cooperative does not supply its 
patrons with any inputs. All of these must be purchased from sources 
outside the cooperative association. In addition, the cooperative must 
purchase some of its inputs from sources outside the cooperative associa­
tion. 
Given these assumptions, only Kuhn-Tucker conditions 3.20 and 3.23 
through 3.27 are relevant. Of these, the interpretations of all but 3.20 
are similar to those corresponding to the general model. Condition 3.20a 
can be rewritten; 
Bp 3q_ ôq. 
&c ieY^ " (1-W^) 
ôp ôq ^ _ ôq ôa 
(p. + 4% â;;) âiT + 13; Eïr - 3^ à;: = ° 
where x represents the product marketed by the cooperative. 
The term p + q Op /9q ) represents the marginal revenue of the 
X X X xc 
member patrons from product x. Thus, [p + q (ôp /ôq )] ôq /ôp X X X  xc xc X  
represents the increase in total revenue of the member patrons arising 
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from the output shift induced by the variation in the price the coopera­
tive offers for x (do ). The term S p.(ôq. /ôp ) represents the in-
X  «X T  1  i c  X  
crease in the total cost of the member patrons due to the shifts in 
factor use which are induced by dq . 
X 
The term p^ + q^^Sp^/aq^) represents the marginal factor cost to 
the cooperative of product x. Thus, [p + q (ôp /Bq )] Sq /ôp repre-
X  X X X  X X  
sents the increase in the total cost of the cooperative from product x 
arising from the changes in the quantities supplied which are induced by 
dp . 
X  
The term X^(ô$/ôq^) is interpreted as the marginal variation in 
the profits of the member patrons arising from a change in the quantity 
of X used in production by the cooperative. This is equivalent to the 
marginal revenue product to the cooperative from product x multiplied 
by s + (l-s)/(l+d^)' . Thus the term \^0$/ôq^) (ôq^/3p^) can be inter­
preted as equivalent to the increase in the total revenue of the 
cooperative from use of product x arising frcm changes in the quantities 
supplied which are induced by dp^, multiplied by s + (1-s)/(1+d^)^ . 
The term interpreted as the marginal variation in the 
profits of the member patrons arising from the change in the ratio of 
nonmember business to total business which is induced by dp^. 
Thus, for a maximum, the sum of the increase in the total revenue 
of the member patrons from the output shift induced by dp^; and the 
increase in the total revenue of the cooperative from use of produce x 
arising from changes in the quantities supplied which are induced by 
dp^, discounted, must equal the sum of the increase in the total cost of 
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the member patrons due to the shifts in factor use which are induced by 
dp^; the increase in the total cost of the cooperative from product x 
arising from the changes in the quantities supplied which are induced by 
dp^, discounted; and the marginal variation in the profits of the member 
patrons arising from the change in the ratio of nonmember business to 
total business that is induced by dp . 
X 
In this model of a single-product marketing cooperative, ôCT^/ôp^j 
the change in the ratio of nonmember business to total business can be 
expressed: 
3a a 
'^ X X 
where is defined as the elasticity of supply in the nonmember market: 
Sq P 
^x ^xo 
and r\ is defined as the elasticity of supply in the general market: 
v. = = v4,15) 
Because of member loyalty to the cooperative or the fact that member 
patrons expect to receive patronage refunds from the cooperative, the 
member market may, in general, be assumed to be less price-responsive 
than the nonmember market. Therefore, may, in general, be assumed to 
be greater than t] so that (r|^ - T|) is greater than zero. Thus, if 
and p^ are positive, 30g/3p^ will, in general, be positive and 
XsCôCTi/ôp^), the marginal variation in the profits of the member patrons 
arising from the change in the ratio of nonmember business to total 
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business which is induced by dp^, will be positive or equal to zero 
depending upon whether the value of is positive or equal to zero. 
No nonmember patrons 
If it is assumed that the cooperative does not serve nonmember 
patrons, condition 4.12 can be simplified. Because the cooperative is 
a single-product cooperative, Sp^/Bq^ = l/Oq^/ôp^^) by the inverse 
function rule of calculus. Simplifying 4.12 and multiplying it by 
9p^/Sq^, it can be rewritten: 
" - ^ ^ ° 
c o 
for the case in which there are no nonmember patrons. 
The term p^ + represents the marginal revenue to the 
member patrons or the marginal factor cost to the cooperative of the 
product produced by the member patrons and marketed through the coopera­
tive. As a marginal revenue, it represents an increase in the profits 
of the member patrons. However, as a zargizzl factor cost to the coopera­
tive, multiplied by s + (1-s^)/(1+d)^ , it represents a decrease in the 
amount of net savings available for distribution to the member patrons 
in patronage refunds. If the proportion of the allocated patronage 
refunds which are paid in the current period is equal to one (s=l) or if 
the cooperative sets its discount rate equal to zero (d^ = 0), the 
marginal revenue to the member patrons and the discounted marginal factor 
cost to the coopérative cancel and p + q Op /ôq ) vanishes from 4.15. 
X X X ^X 
Thus, 4.16 is equivalent to stating that, for a maximum, the sum of 
the increase in the total revenue to the member patrons from the product 
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marketed by the cooperative and the discounted marginal revenue product 
of the product marketed by the cooperative should equal the sum of the 
increase in total cost to the member patrons due to the shifts in factor 
use which accompany an increase in the production of the product marketed 
by the cooperative and the discounted marginal factor cost to the 
cooperative of the product marketed by the cooperative. 
If the proportion of the patronage refunds allocated in the current 
period which are paid in the current period is equal to one (s=l) or if 
the cooperative sets its discount rate equal to zero (d^=0) and the 
product marketed through the cooperative is the only product produced 
by the member patrons, 4.16 is equivalent to stating that for a maximum, 
the marginal increase in the cost of the member patrons from producing 
the product should equal its marginal revenue product in the cooperative. 
If, in addition, the typical member patron does not expect to re-
receive any patronage refunds, from 2.7 its supply curve is its marginal 
cost curve above its average variable cost curve, represented by mc in the 
left panel of Figure 4.1. If this is the case, the supply curve facing 
the cooperative is the horizontal sum of the supply curves of the member 
patrons, represented by MC in the right panel of the figure. The optimum 
price in this example is p^, determined by the intersection of MRP and 
HC. The quantity supplied by the typical member patron will be q^, and 
the total quantity supplied by the member patrons will be q^^^ 
^According to Clark [ll, pp. 38-39], total economic welfare is maxi­
mized at the quantity at which marginal cost is equal to average revenue. 
In this case, the average revenue to the member patrons from x is equiva­
lent to its marginal revenue product in the cooperative. Thus, according 
to Clark's criterion, q' is the quantity at which total economic welfare 
is maximized. 
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If the typical member does expect to receive patronage refunds, its 
marginal cost curve will not be its supply curve. Instead, its supply 
curve, represented by s in Figure 4.1, will lie to the right of its mar­
ginal cost curve. The supply curve facing the cooperative, represented 
by S in the figure, will still be the horizontal sum of the supply curves 
of the member patrons but will lie to the right of MC. 
If it is assumed that all member patrons have the same expectations 
and discount rates, each of their individual supply curves will be an 
equal distance below their marginal cost curves. If this is the case, 
the optimal price will no longer be p^ for at this price q^* will be 
supplied and the marginal cost of the product will not equal its marginal 
revenue product in the cooperative. The optimal price will not be p^, 
determined by the intersection of MEIP and S, for at this price q^ will 
be supplied and the marginal cost of the product again will not equal 
its marginal revenue product in the cooperative. The optimal price will 
be p^' for at this price q^ will be supplied and the marginal cost of 
the product will equal its marginal revenue product in the cooperative. 
The argument that the quantity at which the marginal cost of the 
product equals its marginal revenue product in the cooperative is the 
optimal quantity can be made in terms of producers* and consumers' 
surpluses= The producers' surplus can be defined as the difference 
between what the producers of the product (the member patrons) actually 
receive and what they would be willing to receive for a given quantity, 
a measure of the net benefit or profit they derive from selling the prod­
uct. In Figure 4.1, the producers' surplus is represented by the area 
me s 
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Figure 4.1. Single-product marketing cooperative. 
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below the horizontal line through the equilibrium price and above the 
marginal cost curve. The consumer's surplus can be defined as the 
difference between what the consumer of the product (the cooperative) 
would be willing to pay and what it actually pays for a given quantity, 
a measure of the net benefit or net savings it derives from purchasing 
the product. In the figure, the consumer's surplus is represented by the 
area above the horizontal line through the equilibrium price and below 
the marginal revenue product curve. 
A proprietary firm might be interested in maximizing the consumer's 
surplus alone. This would be accomplished by operating at the point at 
which the marginal revenue product curve intersects the marginal factor 
cost curve instead of where it intersects the marginal cost or supply 
curve. However, the cooperative attempts to maximize the sum of the 
producers' and consumer's surpluses. 
If the supply curve facing the cooperative is the marginal cost 
curve, the cooperative maximizes the profits of its member patrons by 
setting a price equal to the marginal revenue product of the product. 
Unless the marginal revenue product is equal to the average revenue prod­
uct, this price by itself will not result in all of the producer surplus 
being distributed to the member patrons. A price equal to the average 
revenue product would by itself result in all of the producer surplus 
being distributed to the member patrons, but it would not result in a 
maximum. The cooperative, however, can set a price equal to the marginal 
revenue product and still distribute all of the producer surplus through 
the use of patronage refunds. This is an important point, and it takes 
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on more significance in the discussion of the Phillips model. 
If all member patrons do not have the same expectations or discount 
rates, their individual supply curves will not be equidistant from their 
marginal cost curves. This suggests that the value of the maximum 
attained by the cooperative is dependent upon the value of the member 
patrons' expectations, parameters in the program. It also suggests that 
it will be difficult for the cooperative to identify the increase in the 
total cost of the member patrons due to an increase in quantity. There­
fore, when attempting to make maximizing decisions, the cooperative may 
choose to assume that member patrons have identical expectations. 
Single-Product Supply Cooperative 
In this model, the cooperative supplies member and nonmember patrons 
with a single factor of production. This factor is used by the patrons 
in the production of several outputs, each of which is sold outside the 
cooperative association. The cooperative does not market any of the 
outputs for its patrons. In addition, the cooperative must purchase 
from outside the cooperative association the inputs which it uses in 
the production of the factor. 
Given these assumptions, only Kuhn-Tucker conditions 3.21 and 3.24 
through 3.28 are relevant. Of these, the interpretations of all but 3.21 
are similar to those corresponding to the general model. Condition 3.21a 
can be rewritten: 
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where y represents the factor supplied by the cooperative. 
The term p^ + qy^OPy/ôq^,^) represents the marginal factor cost to 
the member patrons of factor x. Thus, [Py + qy^OPy/ôqy^)] ô<ïy^/ôPy 
represents the increase in the total cost of the member patrons from 
shift in factor use induced by the variation in the price the cooperative 
charges for y. The term S p.Oq. /ôp ) represents the increase in 
ieX 1 ic y 
o 
total revenue to the member patrons arising from the output shifts which 
are induced by the variation in p^^ (dp ). The term E P,-(3q,-„/ôP„) 
7 
"o 
•y y isY " y 
represents the increase in total cost from products in set to the 
member patrons arising from the shifts in factor use which are induced by 
dp . 
y 
The term Py + qyOPy/dqy) represents the marginal revenue to the 
cooperative from factor y. Thus, [p^, + q„fôp,yôq^^)] Bq^/Sp^ represents 
J y 7 J J J 
the increase in the total revenue to the cooperative from factor y arising 
from the changes in the quantities supplied which are induced by dpy. 
The term -X^OiVSqy) is interpreted as the marginal variation in the 
profits of the member patrons arising from a change in the quantity of y 
produced by the cooperative. This is equivalent to the marginal cost to 
the cooperative of factor y multiplied by s + (l-s)/(l+d^)^. Thus, the 
term -X^(ô$/3qy)(ôqy/ôPy) can be interpreted as equivalent to the increase 
in the total cost to the cooperative of factor y arising from changes in 
the quantities demanded which are induced by dPy, multiplied by 
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s + (l-s)(l+d)^. The term is interpreted as the marginal 
variation in the profits of the member patrons arising from the change in 
the ratio of nonmember business to total business which is induced by 
dp . 
y 
Thus, for a maximum, the sum of the increase in the total revenue of 
the member patrons from the output shifts induced by dp^; and the increase 
in the total revenue of the cooperative from factor y arising from changes 
in the quantities demanded which are induced by dp^, discounted, must 
equal the sum of the increase in the total cost of the member patrons due 
to the shifts in factor use which are induced by dp^; the increase in the 
total cost of the cooperative from factor y arising from the changes in 
the quantities demanded which are induced by dp^, discounted; and the 
marginal variation in the profits of the member patrons arising from the 
change in the ratio of nonmember business to total business that is 
induced by dp^. This result is very similar to that derived earlier for 
a change in p^ in the model of a single-product marketing cooperative. 
In this model of a single-product supply cooperative, ôa^/ôp^, the 
change in the ratio of nonmember business to total business, can be 
expressed: 
T— = — (e - e) (4.18) 
SPj Py 0 
where e is defined as the elasticity of demand in the nonmember market: 
o 
ôq P 
y yo 
and e is defined as the elasticity of demand in the general market : 
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Again, as in the case of the single-product market cooperative, the 
member market may, in general, be assumed to be less price-responsive 
than the nonmember market. Therefore, may, in general be greater than 
e so that (e^  - c) is greater than zero. Therefore, if and p^ are 
positive, ôa^/oPy will, in general, be positive and ^gOOc/SPy), the 
marginal variation in the profits of the member patrons arising from 
the change in the ratio of nonmember business to total business which is 
induced by dp^, will be positive or equal to zero depending upon whether 
the value of positive or equal to zero. 
No nonmember patrons 
If it is assumed that the cooperative does not serve nonmember 
patrons, condition 4.18 can be simplified. Because the cooperative is a 
single-product cooperative, ôp^/ôq^, = l/CBq^/BPy) by the inverse functi 
rule of calculus. Simplifying 4.IS and multiplying it by Sp^/Bq^, it 
y J 
can be rewritten: 
SP 39; 
- (1 - [s + —1) (p -r q + Z p. 
on 
(l+d f y y ôqy i 
c o 
aqi 
for the cases in which there are no nonmember patrons. 
The term p^ + q^OPy/âq^) represents the marginal factor cost to the 
member patrons or the marginal revenue to the cooperative of the factor 
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produced by the cooperative and sold to the member patrons. As a 
marginal cost, it represents an increase in the costs of the member 
patrons. However, as a marginal revenue to the cooperative, multiplied 
by s + (l-s)/(l+d^)^, it represents an increase in the amount of net 
savings available for distribution to the member patrons in patronage 
refunds. If the proportion of the allocated patronage refunds which are 
paid in the current period is equal to one (s = 1) or if the cooperative 
sets its discount rate equal to zero (d^ = 0), the marginal factor cost 
to the member patrons and the discounted marginal revenue to the coopera­
tive cancel and + q^(dp^/èq^) vanishes from 4.21. 
Thus, 4.21 is equivalent to stating that for a maximum, the sum of 
the increase in the total revenue due to the output shifts which accompany 
an increase in the use of the factor supplied by the cooperative and the 
discounted marginal revenue to the cooperative from the factor supplied 
by the cooperative should equal the increase in total cost to the member 
patrons due to the shifts in factor use and the discounted marginal cost 
to the cooperative of producing it. 
If the proportion of the patronage refunds allocated in the current 
period which are paid in the current period is equal to one (s=l) or if 
the cooperative sets its disccunt rate equal to zero (d^=0) and the 
factor supplied by the cooperative is the only variable factor used by 
the member patrons, 4.21 is equivalent to stating that for a maximum, 
the marginal cost of supplying the factor should equal the marginal 
increases in the revenue of the member patrons from using it. 
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If, in addition, the typical member patron does not expect to 
receive any patronage refunds, from 2.9 its demand curve is its marginal 
value product curve, represented by mvp in the left panel of Figure 4.2. 
If this is the case, the demand curve facing the cooperative is the 
horizontal sum of the demand curves of the member patrons, represented 
by MVP in the right panel of the figure. The optimum price in this 
example is p^, determined by the intersection of MVP and MC. The quantity 
demanded by the typical member patron will be q^, and the total quantity 
demanded by the member patrons will be q^. 
If the typical member does expect to receive patronage refunds, its 
marginal value product curve will not be its demand curve. Instead, its 
demand curve, represented by d in Figure 4.2, will lie to the right of the 
marginal value product curve. The demand curve facing the cooperative, 
represented by D in the figure, will still be the horizontal sum of the 
demand curves of the member patrons but will lie to the right of MVP. 
If it is assumed that all member patrons have the same expectations, 
each of their individual demand curves will be an equal distance above 
their marginal value product curves. If this is the case, the optimal 
price will no longer be p^ for at this price q^' will be demanded and 
the marginal value product of the factor will not equal its marginal 
cost. The optimal price will not be p", determined by the intersection 
J 
of M\,^P and D, for at this price q^ will be supplied and the marginal 
value product of the factor again will not equal its marginal cost. The 
optimal price will be p^' for at this price q' will be supplied and the 
marginal value product of the factor will equal its marginal cost. 
MVP MC 
P. y 
MC MVP mvp 
ym ym ym 
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Figure 4.2. Single-product supply cooperative. 
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Similar to that concerning the model of the single-product marketing 
cooperative, the argument that the quantity at which the marginal value 
product of the factor equals its marginal cost is the optimal quantity can 
be made in terms of producer's and consumers' surpluses. With the excep­
tion that the producer is the cooperative and the consumers are the member 
patrons, the argument is identical to that used in the model of the 
single-product marketing cooperative. 
This result is identical to that found by Enke [19] in his model of 
a consumer cooperative. He suggested that a consumer cooperative which 
took into account its consumers as owners as well as patrons should set 
the price it charges its members for a particular product equal to the 
marginal cost of producing it. A proprietary firm, serving as a supplier, 
would maximize its producer's surplus (profit) by operating at the point 
at which the marginal cost curve intersects the marginal revenue curve 
instead of the marginal value product curve or demand curve. 
If the demand curve facing the cooperative is the marginal value 
product curve, the cooperative maximizes the profits of its member 
patrons by setting a price equal to the marginal cost of the factor. 
Unless the marginal cost is equal to the average cost, this price by 
itself will not result in all of the consumer surplus being distributed 
to the member patrons. A price equal to average cost would by itself 
result in all of the consumer surplus being distributed to the member 
patrons, but it would not result in a maximum. The cooperative, however, 
can set a price equal to the marginal cost and still distribute all of 
the consumer surplus through the use of patronage refunds. 
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Similar to the situation in the model of the single-product market­
ing cooperative, if all member patrons do not have the same expectations, 
their individual demand curves will not be equidistant from their marginal 
value product curves. In this case, it will be difficult for the coopera­
tive to identify the increase in the total revenue due to an increase in 
quantity. Therefore, more support can be given to the suggestion that 
when attempting to make maximizing decisions, the cooperative may choose 
to assume that member patrons have identical expectations. 
Phillips Model 
In the Phillips model of a single-product marketing cooperative [44], 
member patrons produce a single raw product which is processed and then 
marketed by the cooperative. According to Phillips, each member patron 
maximizes its profits by producing the quantity at which the sum of its 
marginal cost and the marginal cost to the cooperative is equal to the 
marginal revenue from the processed product. 
Aresvik [5] pointed out that the net savings that a member receives 
from the cooperative is usually the difference between the average 
revenue from the processed product and its average cost. He, therefore, 
argued that each member patron maximized its profit by producing the 
quantity at which the sum of its marginal cost and the average cost to 
the cooperative is equal to the average revenue of the processed product. 
Helmberger and Hoos [28, footnote 24, p. 285] indicated that their 
results were consistent with Aresvik's conclusions. 
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The model presented here can be made to correspond to the assump­
tions made in the Phillips model by assuming that the cooperative serves 
member patrons who produce a single-product (x), that the cooperative 
uses this product in the production of a single output (2) which it 
markets, that the proportion of the allocated patronage refunds which are 
paid in the current period is equal to one (s=l), and that the production 
of each unit of z requires exactly one unit of x. 
Given these assumptions, condition 3.23a can be simplified to: 
The term p^ + q^Op^/ôq^) represents the marginal revenue to the coopera­
tive from product z. The term -\^0$/ôq^) is interpreted as the marginal 
cost to the cooperative association of producing product z. This con­
sists of the marginal increase in the cost to the member patrons from 
supplying the raw product x used in the production of the processed prod­
uct z plus the marginal cost to the cooperative of producing z. Thus, 
4.22 is equivalent to stating that, for a maximum, the marginal increase 
in the cost to the member patrons from supplying the raw product x plus 
the marginal cost to the cooperative of producing 2 should equal the 
marginal revenue to the cooperative from producing z. 
This result can be used to vindicate, in part, the conclusions 
arrived to by Phillips. If the typical member patron does not expect to 
receive any patronage refunds, from 2.7 its supply curve is its marginal 
cost curve above its average variable cost curve, represented by mc^ in 
the left panel of Figure 4.3. If this is the case, the supply curve facing 
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Figure 4.3, Phillips model of a marketing cooperative. 
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the cooperative is the horizontal sum of the supply curves of the member 
patrons, represented by MC^ in the right panel of the figure. The optimum 
price the cooperative should offer for the raw product x is p^, determined 
by the intersection of the cooperative's marginal revenue curve MR and 
and MC^ + MC^, the curve which represents the sum of the marginal cost to 
the member patrons of producing x (NC^) and the marginal cost to the 
cooperative of processing it (MC^) The quantity of x supplied by the 
typical member patron will be q^, and the total quantity supplied by the 
member patrons will be q^. The price the cooperative receives for the 
orocessed product z is determined from the average revenue curve AR and 
z 
will be p'. 
z 
Thus, in this example, Phillips' condition that, for a maximum, the 
sum of the marginal cost to the member patron and the marginal cost to 
the cooperative should be equal to the marginal revenue from the proc­
essed product holds. However, it is important to point out that, in 
this model, it is the decisions of the cooperative, not of the member 
patrons, which ensure that a maximum is obtained. If it is construed 
that the member patrons make all decisions, Trifon's [5l] criticisms 
(mentioned in the literature review) are still valid. 
If all member patrons are assumed to have the same expectations of 
the per-unit patronage refund, their individual supply curves will be 
equidistant from their marginal cost curves as in the model of the single 
product marketing cooperative. If this is the case, Phillips' condition 
again holds for a maximum. However, if it is assumed that all member 
patrons do not have the same expectations, their individual supply curves 
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will not be equidistant from their marginal cost curves and Phillips' 
condition cannot be shown to always hold at a maximum. 
Aresvik's condition that, for a maximum, the sum of the marginal 
cost to the member patron and the average cost to the cooperative should 
be equal to the average revenue from the processed product does not hold 
for the cases of zero or identical member patron expectations. Aresvik's 
contention that this condition holds at a maximum is based on the fact 
that the net savings that a member receives from the cooperative is 
usually the difference between the average revenue from the processed 
product and its average cost. 
This is true, and if the cooperative must distribute its net savings 
to its member patrons solely through the price it offers them, it will 
produce the quantity of product z at which the sum of the marginal cost 
to the member patron and the average cost to the cooperative equals the 
average revenue from the product. At this quantity, the sum of the 
marginal costs will be greater and the marginal revenue will be lower 
than at the maximum. Therefore, profits will be Icwer than at the =2xi-
mum. 
However, if the cooperative is able to utilize patronage refunds to 
distribute its net savings, it will be able to price in such a manner 
that the maximum quantity of z is produced. The sum of the price and 
the per-unit patronage refund, not the price alone, will then be equal 
to the difference between the average revenue from the processed product 
and its average cost. In both the Aresvik discussion of the Phillips 
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model and the Helmberger and Hoos model, prices alone are used to dis­
tribute the net savings of the cooperative to its member patrons.^ It 
is also true that in the original Phillips model, no mention is made of 
patronage refunds. Thus, although Phillips suggested the correct opti-
mality condition, his model is not satisfactory in that it does not 
provide a mechanism by which the cooperative can distribute its net 
savings to its member patrons. 
In the Phillips model of a single-product supply cooperative, member 
patrons purchase a single raw product from the cooperative. This product 
is processed and then marketed by the individual member patrons. The 
member patrons are single-product firms in that this processed product is 
their only output. Again, according to Phillips, each member patron 
maximizes its profits by producing the quantity at which the sum of its 
marginal cost and the marginal cost to the cooperative is equal to the 
marginal revenue from the processed product. 
The model presented here can be made to correspond to the assumptions 
made in the Phillips model by assuming that the cooperative produces a 
The Helmberger and Hoos model is actually a generalization of the 
Phillips-Aresvik model in which the amount of the raw product which is 
required to produce a unit of the processed product is not fixed. Because 
prices alone are used to distribute the net savings of the cooperative to 
its member patrons in the Helmberger and Hoos model, it is subject to the 
same criticisms which can be applied to the Aresvik discussion of the 
Phillips model. In the Helmberger and IIoos model, the price of the raw 
product equals the difference between the price of the processed product 
and its average total cost, multiplied by the ratio of the quantity of 
the processed product to the quantity of the raw product used (which is 
equal to one in the Aresvik example). If the cooperative is able to 
utilize patronage refunds to distribute its net savings, the price of the 
raw product should equal its marginal product. The Hardie model is not 
subject to this criticism because of the special assumptions of the 
linear programming model. 
126 
single product (y), that the member patrons use this product in the 
production of a single output (x) which they market, that the proportion 
of the allocated patronage refunds which are paid in the current period 
is equal to one (s=l), and that the production of each unit of x requires 
exactly one unit of y. 
Given these assumptions, condition 3.21a can be simplified to: 
"i 5 ^ ^ ° 
The term p^ represents the marginal revenue to the member patrons from 
product x. Because it is assumed in this study that member patrons are 
price-takers, the marginal revenue to the member patrons is equal to the 
price. The term S p.(ôq./ôq ) can be interpreted as the marginal 
isYg 1 1 = 
increase in the cost to the member patrons from producing x. Finally, 
the term -Xj^O^/ôqy) can be interpreted as the marginal cost to the 
cooperative of producing y. Thus, 4.23 is equivalent to stating that, 
i. o LUO-^ X 1 th£ zsrsinal increase in the cost to the member natrons 
from producing x plus the marginal cost to the cooperative of producing 
y should equal the marginal revenue to the member patrons from product x. 
It can be shown that if the member patrons do not expect to receive 
any patronage refunds or if it is assumed that all member patrons have 
the same expectations of the per-unit patronage refund, Phillips' condi­
tion will hold for a maximum. However, the same criticisms which were 
made of the Phillips model of a single-product marketing cooperative can 
be made of the Phillips model of a single-product supply cooperative. It 
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is the cooperative, not member patrons, which must ensure that a maximum 
is obtained. In addition this model does not provide a mechanism by 
which the cooperative can distribute its net savings to its member 
patrons. 
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CHAPTER V. FUTURE EFFECTS 
Model 
Expression 2.3 provides a mechanism by which decisions made during 
the current period may affect the profits of the member patrons in future 
periods. The mechanics of these effects are represented by 2.56 and 2.57. 
Decisions which affect the net savings of a department within the coopera­
tive affect the patronage refunds on the products in that department and, 
therefore, may affect the decisions made by member patrons in future 
periods through the effect the current patronage refunds have on the 
member patron's expectations of future refunds. 
In the model presented in this chapter, the effects current decisions 
have on the profits of the member patrons in future periods are considered. 
The cooperative decision-maker is assumed to maximize the total discounted 
profits of its member patrons over the time horizon of the cooperative: 
T M 
n = I z -__/(i+dr)^ (5.1) 
t=Om=l 
where TT . is the profit of the m-th member firm in the t-th period and d^ 
dt X 
is the discount rate used to determine the present value of future profits. 
This rate is set by the cooperative decision-maker and may be different 
than d_. The time horizon T is defined as the number of periods in which 
decisions made in the current period have an effect. 
It should be noted that the profits of the member patrons in future 
periods (t=l, 2, ..., T) are expected profits. The cooperative must make 
decisions based on a set of expected prices and on expected forms of the 
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production functions and the demand and supply functions. The profits 
of the member patrons in uhe current period (t=0) are, however, actual 
profits. Whereas, the member patrons do not know the per-unit patronage 
refunds for the current period and, therefore, must maximize expected 
profits, the cooperative determines the per-unit patronage refunds and 
can, therefore, maximize actual profits in the current period. 
The objective function 5.1 which the cooperative is assumed to 
maximize is subject to several constraints. There is a production 
function similar to 3.2 for each time period t. There is also a set of 
fixed factor constraints similar to 3.16 and a nonmember-business con­
straint 3.17 for each time period t. Finally, 3.15 is included as a 
constraint. It ensures that the total of the amounts of the indirect 
departmental costs allocated must equal the total indirect departmental 
cost. 
With the problem as stated, the Lagrangian function can be 
expressed: 
4 Pit vt + + 
" tSo " À 
+ - : Cik) (5-2) 
where is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the production 
function for the t-th period, the A.2it the Lagrange multipliers 
corresponding to the fixed-factor constraints for the t-th period, 
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is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the nonmember-business con­
straint for the t-th period, and is the Lagrange multiplier corre­
sponding to the indirect-cost-allocation constraint. In this function 
as in the rest of this chapter, a symbol with a t subscript denotes a 
value in the t-th period. Absence of a t subscript denotes a value in 
the current period (in which t = 0)„ 
As with the model presented in Chapters III and IV, the prices that 
the cooperative sets for the products in set C, the quantities of the 
products in sets G and Z it produces, and the quantities of each of the 
variable inputs in set V and of each of the fixed factors in set which 
the cooperative uses in the production of each of the products in sets 
G, Y^, and Z are instruments. In addition, because the decisions made 
by member patrons in future periods may be affected by current per-unit 
patronage refunds, the cost allocations of the cooperative, determined 
in the second stage of the decision-making prices, are also instruments 
in this model. 
Given these instruments, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the problem 
represented by 5.2 are as follows. Except for 5.16, the numbers in 
parentheses represent the terms in the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker condi­
tions for the model in which future effects are not considered- 5.16 is 
presented in order, following the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. 
for all jsX^: 
^ = (3.20a) + (5.16) s 0 (5.3a) 
ÔP. 
• p. = 0 (5.3b) 
BPj J 
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p .  s  0  
J 
for all jeY 
^ = (3.21a) + (5.16) ^  0 
apj 
p. S 0 
J 
for all jeG: 
^ = (3.22a) s 0 
• "j = ° 
q. S 0 
J 
for all jeZ: 
^ = (3.23a) + (5.16) s 0 
o,i 
aqj " 
q. s 0 
J 
for all leV; jeY^, Z: 
ar 
= (3.24a) + (5.16) s 0 
(5.3c) 
(5.4a) 
(5.4b) 
(5.4c) 
(5.5a) 
(5.5b) 
(5.5c) 
(5.6a) 
(5.6b) 
(5.6c) 
(5.7a) 
(5.7b) 
(5.7c) 
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for all ieV; jeG: 
= (3.24a) ^  0 
oq. . 
"ij ^  ° 
for all ieW ; jeY , Z: 
c c 
an 
SSij 
= (3.25a) + (5.16) ^  0 
Qij = 0 
for all ieW^; jeG: 
|E— = (3.25a) 
aqy 
' "'ij ° ° 
•'ij = ° 
for the k-th department: 
§r- = -[s + (1-s) 1 + (5.16) - X4 3 0 
° Ik (1+d )^ 
c 
3Ci, • = ° 
Clk = ° 
(5.8a) 
(5.8b) 
(5.8c) 
(5.9a) 
(5.9b) 
(5.9c) 
(5.10a) 
(5.10b) 
(5.10c) 
(5.11a) 
(5.11b) 
(5.11c) 
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for 
=  4 = 0  ( 5 . 1 2 )  
ôXij. 
for X2it' 1:%:= 
^ • jj.Z ' ° 
%; • ^2it = 0 
>.2it ^ ° (5.13c) 
for X3^: 
—— = CT - CT s 0 (5.14a) 
ÔXst ot 
• Ht = ° 
^3^ â 0 (5.14c) 
for X^: 
/i n —. n  ^  ^ 1  ^  ^
OK^ J. ^ itc 
where : 
T M ôq . 3q . 
(5.16)= r I S ^ Vâî^' 
t>0 is S in=l geX o^imt geY ^ ° imt 
art ^ ôr. _ T M ôq ^ 
 ^  ^ i:s -s^  c 
ôq ôr* . ôr. T M 
- Jv sC' 5?f «i^ s .El Je 
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in which S represents the subset of products in set C, the per-unit 
patronage refunds of which are affected by the instrument which is 
represented by I. 
Because a change in the price the cooperative sets for any product 
in set C can affect the quantity supplied or demanded of any product in 
set C (see 2.43), S=C for I=pj, j e C. All other instruments affect only 
the per-unit patronage refunds for the products in a single department, 
the net savings of which is affected by the instrument. Thus, S=X^, 
where is the subset of products in set X purchased by the department 
which produces product j, for I=q^, j e Z. S=Dj, where is the subset 
of products in set X^ purchased by the department which produces product 
j if it is a marketing department and is the subset of products in set 
produced by the department if it is a supply department, for 
i e V, j e Y^, Z. Finally, S=D^ where is the subset of products in 
set X^ purchased by the k-th department if it is a marketing department 
and is the subset of products in set Y^ purchased by the k-th department 
if it is a supply department, for 1=0^^. 
The symbol rT^^ in 5.16 represents the m-th member patron's expected 
per-unit patronage refund for the i-th product in the t-th period. The 
partial derivative ôq ./ôrt ^ is given for the typical member patron by gmt imt 
2.56, in which k=g and l=i. The partial derivative Srt^^/Br^ is 
determined by 2.3. Because normember patrons do not receive patronage 
refunds, they are not involved in the future effects of current decisions. 
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The partial derivative àr^/ôl represents the effect of a change in 
the instrument I on the i-th per-unit patronage refund. It can be 
determined by 3.11, using information from 3.9 and from 3.12. Because 
the expansion of ôr^/ôl provides no further economic insight into the 
effect, it is not presented here. 
Analys is 
In 5.16, the term S p ^(ôq ^/ôr. ) represents the marginal 
geX 
variation in the total revenue of the m-th member patron in period t 
(t > 0) from the products in set X arising from output shifts which are 
induced by a variation in the member firms expectation of the per-unit 
patronage refund for product i (dr* ). The term Z p .Oq ./ôr* ) 
imt ggY gt gmt imt 
represents the marginal variation in the total cost of the m-th member 
patron in period t from the products in set Y arising from shifts in 
factor use which are induced by dr* imt 
Again, letting s' represent s + (l-s)/(l+d )^, the term s' S p 
geX: S 
(ôq ^/ôr* ) represents the marginal variation in total collective gmt imt 
costs in period t from the products in set arising from changes in the 
quantities supplied by the m-th member patron which are induced by 
drt • The term s' 2 p ^(ôq _/&rt _) represents the marginal vari-imt gt ^gmt imt 
tion in total collective revenues in period t from the produces in set 
arising from changes in the quantities demanded by the m-th member 
patron which are induced by dr* ^ . imt. 
The term ° ^ *c' be interpreted as the 
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The term ' 6 G Y^, can be interpreted as the marginal 
variation in the discounted profits of the member patrons in the t-th 
period arising from a change in the quantity of output g in set Y^ pro­
duced in the t-th period, and X.^^(84V&qg^), g e X^, can be interpreted 
as the marginal variation in the discounted profits of the member patrons 
in the t-th period arising from a change in the quantity of input g in 
set X^ used in production by the cooperative in the t-th period. 
The term ^ 3^' i € C, can be interpreted as the marginal 
variation in the discounted profits of the member patrons in the t-th 
period from the change in the ratio of nonmember business to total busi­
ness in the t-th period which is induced by a variation in the current 
per-unit patronage refund for the i-th product in set C. The partial 
derivative 30g^/3r^ can be determined by applying the quotient rule of 
calculus on 3.18, in which t=0 and i=g. Unfortunately, this expansion 
provides little economic insight into this effect and is, therefore, not 
presented. 
Given these interpretations, 5.16 can be interpreted as the net 
increase (or decrease) in the discounted profits of the member patrons 
in future periods arising from an increase in the instrument I. In each 
of the conditions, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.7, and 5.9, the terms represented 
by 5-16 accompany the terms which appear in the corresponding conditions 
for the model in which future effects are not considered. 
Stated briefly, if the future effects are ignored, as they are in 
the current-effects model of the previous chapters, each of these condi­
tions is equivalent to stating that, for a maximum, the increase in the 
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total current revenue of the member patrons (including the increase in 
the total collective revenues of the member patrons) resulting from a 
change in the value of the instrument must equal the increase in the 
total current cost of the member patrons (including the increase in the 
total collective costs of the member patrons) resulting from a change in 
the value of the instrument. If the future effects are considered, the 
terms represented by 5.16 appear in the conditions. Thus, if the net 
increase in the discounted profits of the member patrons in future 
periods arising from an increase in the instrument I is positive, the 
optimal value of the instrument will be greater than if only the current 
effects are considered. 
Conditions 5.5, 5.8, and 5.9 concern the optimal level of the public 
goods and the factors used by the cooperative to produce them. Because 
it is not assumed that the current level of the public goods affects 
future production and because the cost of providing the public goods is 
charged to indirect departmental costs instead of to the departments, 
there are no future effects accompanying the provision of the public 
goods. Thus, conditions 5.5, 5.8, and 5.9 are identical to conditions 
3.22, 3.24, and 3.25 for the current-effects model. 
Condition 5.11 concerns the allocation of the indirect departmental 
costs to the departments and does not appear in the current-effects 
model. This is because in the second stage of maximization, the total 
indirect departmental cost C^ is a constant. The distribution of 
patronage refunds will be contingent upon the allocation of these costs, 
but the level of the total current profits of the member patrons will not 
1 3 8  
because current patronage refunds do not affect current behavior. How­
ever, when future effects are considered, 5.11 becomes important because 
current patronage refunds do affect future behavior. 
The Lagrange multiplier indicates how much the profits of the 
member patrons would increase with a one-unit increase in the level of 
Cj, the total indirect departmental cost. A one-unit increase in 
would decrease the amount of the net savings of the cooperative available 
for distribution as patronage refunds. Thus, is equal to - s + (1-s)/ 
(l+d^)^ and condition 5.11a is equivalent to 5.16. 
Hence, 5.11 is equivalent to stating that, for a maximum, if a 
positive allocation of indirect departmental costs is made to the k-th 
department, the net increase in the discounted profits of the member 
patrons in future periods arising from an increase in the level of 
indirect departmental costs allocated to the department should be equal 
to zero. In other words, the sum of the discounted future costs in 5.16 
resulting from the department's allocation should equal the sum of the 
discounted future revenues resulting from it. 
Conditions 5.12 through 5.15 are simply restatements of the 
constraints. 
As apparent from 5.16, the effects of current decisions on future 
profits are complex. The difficulty of considering the future effects of 
current decisions is complicated by the amount of information concerning 
the future which the cooperative decision-maker must know in order to 
evaluate these effects. Among the values which the cooperative decision-
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maker must know for each of the future periods within the time horizon 
(t=l, ..., T) are : 
Pgt SGX, Y 
* 
^^gmt^^^imt geX, Y 
m=l, ..., M 
ieC 
ôr* ^ /âr. ifiC imt i in 1 5 o » o 3 M 
gec 
ÔQot/ô^i isC. 
Many of these values are contingent upon future decisions by the coopera­
tive. Some, such as the future prices of products in sets and are 
even determined outside of the cooperative association. 
This suggests that if the cooperative is to take future effects 
into consideration during its decision-making process, it must develop 
forecasting techniques capable of estimating some of the future values. 
However, because of the volume of information concerning the future which 
is necessary, it is likely that the cooperative decision-maker will have 
only a rough idea of how his decisions will affect future profits and 
that the time horizon of the cooperative cannot extend very far into the 
future. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
Some of the problems of the cooperative association were discussed, 
and related literature was reviewed in an effort to see how well it pro­
vided solutions. The purpose of this study was established as that of 
developing a short-run model of the cooperative association which could 
be used to analyze problems not discussed in the literature. 
In particular, an attempt was made to develop a normative-
prescriptive model of a multi-product marketing and supply cooperative 
which served both member and nonmember patrons. Using this model, 
analyses of the decisions of the cooperative decision maker on prices, 
patronage refunds, allocation of joint fixed costs, and determination of 
the optimal level of cooperative-provided public goods were performed. 
Development of the model began with the construction of a non­
linear programming sub-model of a typical multi-product member patron. 
The typical member patron was assumed to maximize its expected profits, 
including the present value of its expected patronage refunds. Expected 
per-unit patronage refunds were assumed to be functions of the actual 
per-unit refunds in past periods. The typical member patron purchased 
inputs from the cooperative and marketed some of its outputs through the 
cooperative, but was not required to deal exclusively with the coopera­
tive. In addition, the production of the member patron was augmented by 
the provision of public goods by the cooperative. 
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A similar sub-model of a typical nonmember patron was also 
developed. The primary difference between this sub-model and that of 
the typical member patron was that the nonmember patron did not receive 
patronage refunds. 
From the optimality conditions determined for these two sub-models, 
individual output supply and input demand functions were derived for 
the patrons. The prices set by the cooperative and the markets outside 
the cooperative association and the levels of the cooperative-provided 
public goods were arguments in all of these functions. In addition, the 
expected per-unit patronage refunds were arguments in the functions of 
the typical member patron. By horizontally summing these individual 
supply and demand functions across all member and across all nonmember 
patrons, aggregate functions were determined. 
The cooperative decision-maker was assumed to maximize the total 
profits of its member patrons. This was accomplished in two stages. In 
the first stage, the decision-maker determined the optimal prices for the 
products it marketed and supplied and the optimal level of public goods 
it provided. In the second stage, at the end of its accounting period 
when its costs and net savings are known, it determined patronage refunds. 
The optimality conditions for the general model of the cooperative 
were analyzed. Simplified models, including that of a single-product 
marketing cooperative, that of a single-product supply cooperative, and 
the Phillips model, were also analyzed and were compared to the 
literature. 
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Finally, the general model of the cooperative was extended to enable 
consideration of the effects on the member patrons' future profits of 
current decisions. The cooperative decision-maker was assumed to maxi­
mize the total discounted profits of the member patrons over the time 
horizon of the cooperative. In this model, the allocation of indirect 
departmental costs to the departments of the cooperative became an instru­
ment. The optimality conditions for this model were analyzed and com­
pared to those of the previous one. 
Conclusions 
The principal conclusion determined in this study is that the task 
of the cooperative decision-maker is a difficult one. The optimality 
conditions derived for the cooperative in this study are complex. In 
addition to the revenue and cost terms which are associated with the 
production and marketing activities of the cooperative and which have 
analogues in the optimality conditions for the firm, the optimality con­
ditions for the cooperative also include revenue and cost terms corre­
sponding to the market activities of the member patrons. In addition, 
they include terms representing variations in the profits of the member 
patrons arising from changes in the ratio of nonmember business to total 
business. Not only are the optimality conditions which were derived for 
the cooperative in this study complex, but there is a great amount of 
information which is necessary to evaluate them. It is doubtful that a 
cooperative of any complexity will be able to fully attain the objective 
of maximizing its member patrons' profits. 
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This point is especially relevant when the effects on the member 
patrons' future profits of current decisions are considered. When the 
future effects are considered, the optimality conditions become more 
complex and there is a greater amount of information which is necessary 
to evaluate them. Much of this information is contingent upon the future 
decisions of the cooperative. In fact, some of it is determined outside 
of the cooperative association. 
This suggests that if the cooperative is to take future effects 
into consideration during its decision-making process, it must develop 
forecasting techniques capable of estimating some of this information. 
Still, it is likely that the cooperative decision-maker will have only a 
rough idea of how his decisions will affect future profits and that the 
time horizon of the cooperative cannot extend very far into the future. 
Nevertheless, many of the results of this study should be useful. 
The optimality conditions presented here should be of value to the 
cooperative which is attempting to maximize the profits of its member 
patrons even if it is not entirely successful in doing so. From the out­
set, the model developed in this study was never intended to be a posi­
tive one but a normative-prescriptive one--one which would provide rules 
of behavior by which cooperatives might strive to optimize their member 
patrons' profits. 
The model presented in this study was used to clarify several points 
in the theory surrounding cooperatives. A distinction was drawn between 
the marginal cost found in a model of a multi-product firm and the 
marginal variable cost found in a model of a single-product firm. The 
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difference is that the former must include the marginal opportunity cost 
of using fixed factors of production. 
It was demonstrated that under the assumptions of the Phillips 
model, his conclusion that, for a maximum, the sum of the marginal cost 
to the member patron and the marginal cost to the cooperative should be 
equal to the marginal revenue from the processed product may indeed be 
true. However, it was pointed out that it is the decisions of the 
cooperative, not of the member patrons, which ensure that a maximum 
is obtained. It was also pointed out that the Phillips model does not 
provide a mechanism by which the cooperative can distribute its net 
savings to its member patrons. 
In a related way, it was shown that if a single-product cooperative 
must distribute its net savings to its member patrons solely through the 
price it sets, the profits of the member patrons may be lower than if 
the cooperative is able to utilize patronage refunds to distribute its 
net savings. The use of patronage refunds ensures that the net savings 
of the cooperative can be distributed to its member patrons while prices 
are used to fulfill the optimality conditions. 
Finally, it was demonstrated that the allocation of joint costs 
can be used as an instrument if the futu~e behavior of member patrons 
is assumed to be influenced by the level of current per-unit patronage 
refunds. 
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Further Research 
As mentioned earlier in this study, there is no general agreement 
on what the objective or objectives of the cooperative are or should be. 
It would be interesting to carry out the type of analysis performed here 
for different objective functions and to compare the results. Candidates 
might include maximization of a weighted sum of the member patrons' 
profits, the net savings (or patronage refunds) of the cooperative, or 
a multiple-argument objective function. Arguments in a multiple-argument 
function might include the quantities of various products sold or 
marketed through the cooperative. 
It was also indicated earlier that there were two types of public 
goods which might be provided by the cooperative. There are those which 
affect production and there are those which affect price. Only the former 
was analyzed here. Although Ladd [35] has done some work with the latter, 
it would be interesting to do more. In particular, it would be interest­
ing to analyze the effects price-augmentiug, cooperative-provided public 
goods might have on the prices the member patrons might receive from 
markets outside the cooperative association. 
Finally, it might be interesting to examine alternative methods of 
determining patronage refunds whan there is a department in the coopera­
tive which consists of products which are sold to patrons and which rely 
on products purchased from patrons as major inputs. Such an analysis 
might involve both questions of efficiency and equity. 
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APPENDIX A. LIST OF SYMBOLS 
The following is a list of symbols used in the models presented in 
this study. The symbols are listed in alphabetical order, those in the 
Roman alphabet preceding those in the Greek alphabet. If a number follows 
the explanation of a particular symbol, it refers to the equation in which 
the corresponding term is defined. The existence of a t subscript denotes 
a value in the t-th time period. The absence of a t subscript denotes a 
value in the current period. The absence of an m subscript in a symbol 
for which one is given denotes a value for the typical member patron. 
b The base sum in the cooperative's tax bill. 
C The set of outputs sold to and variable inputs purchased 
from the cooperative by the member and nonmember patrons. 
The amount of direct departmental costs allocated to the 
k-th department. 
Cj The cooperative's total indirect departmental cost. 
The amount of indirect departmental costs allocated to the 
k-th department. 
C, The amount of indirect cost allocated to the k-th department 
" (3.14). 
D The determinant of the Jacobian matrix J. 
D. . The cofactor of the element in the i-th row and j-th column 
of the Jacobian matrix J. 
The subset if k is a marketing department and if k is 
a supply department. 
d The discount rate of the typical member patron. 
d The discount rate used by the cooperative to discount alloca­
ted patronage refunds. 
d^ The discount rate used by the cooperative to determine the 
present value of future profits. 
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DS The total dividend on member stock. 
ds The dividends on stock held by the typical member patron. 
The average fixed cost allocated to the i-th product. 
fc The fixed costs of the typical member patron or typical non-
member patron. 
FCC The total fixed costs of the cooperative. 
FCM The total fixed costs of the member patrons. 
G The set of public goods provided by the cooperative. 
I An instrument. 
J The Jacobian matrix corresponding to the problem of the 
typical member patron (2.41). 
L The Lagrangian function corresponding to the cooperative's 
problem of maximizing the total current profits of its 
member patrons (3.19) . 
M The number of member patrons in the cooperative association. 
NS The total net savings of the cooperative (3.10). 
NS^ The cooperative's net savings from member business. 
NS^ The net savings of the k-th department (3.9). 
!NS, The nec savings of the k-th departmeui: from member business, 
kc 
NS The cooperative's net savings from nonmember business. 
"D 
"X 
A vector of the prices of the outputs in set X produced by 
the member and nonmember patrons. 
Py A vector of the prices of the variable inputs in set Y used 
by the member and nonmember patrons. 
p^ The price of the i-th product. 
"k 
p^ The price or effective price of the i-th product. 
PR The amount of patronage refunds allocated by the cooperative 
(3.4). 
PVPR The present value of allocated patronage refunds. 
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pvpr The present value of the patronage refunds allocated to the 
typical member patron (2.2). 
Qg A vector of the quantities of each of the public goods in 
set G provided by the cooperative. 
Qy A vector of the quantities of each of the variable inputs in 
set V used by the cooperative and purchased from outside 
the cooperative association. 
A vector of the quantities of each of the fixed inputs in 
c set used by the cooperative. 
A vector of the quantities of each of the outputs in set X 
produced by the member and nonmember patrons and used by 
the cooperative. 
Qy A vector of the quantities of each of the variable inputs in 
set Y purchased by the member and nonmember patrons. 
A vector of the quantities of each of the outputs in set Z 
produced by the cooperative and sold to buyers outside the 
cooperative association. 
q^ The quantity of the i-th product. 
q. The quantity of the i-th product purchased or sold by the 
member patrons. 
q.. The quantity of the i-th product used in the production of 
the j-th product. 
q._ The stock of the i-th fixed factor available. lO 
q. The quantity of the i-th product purchased or sold by the 
nonmember patrons. 
q^ A vector of the quantities of each of the fixed inputs in 
f set Wg used by the typical member patron. 
q^ A vector of the quantities of each of the outputs in set X 
produced by the typical member patron. 
qy A vector of the quantities of each of the variable inputs 
in set Y used by the typical member patron. 
R The amount which must be taken out of the net savings from 
member business to meet the requirements of the cooperative 
(3.5). 
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A vector of the past actual per-unit patronage refunds. 
R A vector of the typical member patron's expected per-unit 
patronage refunds. 
R^ The amount deducted from the net savings from member business 
of department k to meet the requirements of the cooperative. 
r^ The per-unit patronage refund on the i-th product (3.11). 
r* The m-th member patron's expected per-unit patronage refund 
on the i-th product (2.3). 
Req The amount which must be taken out of the net savings of the 
cooperative before patronage refunds can be allocated (3.6). 
RS The retained savings which the cooperative adds to its sur­
plus account. 
S The subset of products in set C, the per-unit patronage 
refunds of which are affected by the instrument I. 
s The proportion of allocated patronage refunds paid in cash. 
s' s + (1-s)/(1+d )^ 
c 
T The length of the cooperative's time horizon. 
TCC Total collective costs. 
TCP Total collective profits. 
TCR Total collective revenues. 
TI The portion of the cooperative's taxable income for which 
the cooperative must pay the base sum b. 
TMP Total member profits. 
TPC Total private costs. 
TPP Total private profits. 
TPR Total private revenues. 
TX The cooperative's total tax bill (3.3). 
t The cooperative's marginal tax rate. 
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The set of variable inputs used by the cooperative and 
purchased from outside the cooperative association. 
The average variable cost allocated to the i-th product. 
The set of fixed inputs available to the cooperative. 
The set of fixed factors available to the typical member 
patron. 
The set of outputs produced by the member and nonmember 
patrons. 
The subset of outputs in set X which are produced by the 
member and nonmember patrons and sold to the cooperative. 
The subset of products in set X handled by the k-th depart­
ment. 
The subset of outputs in set X which are produced by the 
member and nonmember patrons and sold to buyers outside the 
cooperative association. 
The set of variable inputs purchased by the member and non-
member patrons. 
The subset of variable inputs in set Y purchased by the 
member and nonmember patrons from the cooperative. 
The subset of products in set Y produced in the k-th depart­
ment. 
The subset of variable inputs in set Y purchased by the member 
and nonmember patrons from sellers outside the cooperative 
association. 
The set of outputs produced by the cooperative and sold to 
buyers outside the cooperative association. 
The subset products in set Z produced in the k-th department. 
The Lagrangian function corresponding to the cooperative's 
problem of maximizing the total discounted profits of its 
member patrons over its time horizon (5.2). 
The Lagrangian function corresponding to the problem of the 
typical nonmember patron (2.28). 
The slack variable found in the i-th Kuhn-Tucker condition. 
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e The elasticity of demand in the general market (4.20). 
The elasticity of demand in the nonmember market (4.19). 
A The Lagrangian function corresponding to the problem of the 
typical member patron (2.5). 
The Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the cooperative's 
production function. 
^2. The Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the cooperative's 
^ i-th fixed-factor constraint. 
The Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the cooperative's 
nonmember-business constraint. 
The Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the cooperative's 
indirect-departmental-cost-allocation constraint. 
r| The elasticity of supply in the general market (4.15). 
The elasticity of supply in the nonmember market (4.14). 
n The total profits of the member patrons (3.1). 
IÎ The total discounted profits of the member patrons (5.1). 
TT The profit of the m-th member patron (2.1). 
in 
The ratio of the net savings of the k-th department to the 
total business of the k-th department (3.12). 
a The maximum proportion of nonmember business allowed by law. 
The proportion of nonmember business (3.18). 
T The length of the cooperative's revolving fund, 
$ The implicit form of the production of the cooperative (3.2). 
(J The implicit form of the production function of the typical 
member patron or typical nonmember patron (2.4). 
0^ The first-order partial derivative 
2 
The second-order partial derivative S 
The Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the production 
function of the typical member patron or typical nonmember 
patron. 
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The Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the i-th fixed-
factor constraint (2.5) of the typical member patron or 
typical nonmember patron. 
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APPENDIX B. PROOFS 
Proof 1 
This proof is intended to relate -Yj(ô0/ôq^) for an output k to 
the marginal cost of producing the output. 
The total differential of the production function 0 is: 
^ ^ ^ 
C  
A change in total cost is: 
dC^ = S p.* dq, + S Y., dq (A.2) 
ieY " - ieW^ -
where : 
p^* = p^ - s • r^* - (1-s) r^*/(l+d)^ for all isY^ in the case 
of a member patron, 
= p^ in the case of a nonmember patron and for all ieY^. 
Setting: 
à(p — G 
dq. = G for all ieX except i = k. 
" X  
d0 becomes: 
Thus : 
Dividing A.2 by A.4, the marginal cost of producing output k is: 
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ôqr 
jy 
à ^  " 4, k 
(A.5) 
From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions: 
* = Y â^_ + p. = , ^ 6. for all ieY 
1 1 ôq^ 1 (A. 6) 
and: 
^21 = *1 ttr (A. 7) 
where : 
6^ > 0 if = 0 
6. = 0 if q. > 0. 
1 1 
Substituting A.5 and A.7 into A.5, it becomes: 
aqi 3qi Jy.W. ^  
' t 
(A. 8) 
If it is assumed that no factor will come into use that is not already 
in use, either 6,. or dq. will equal zero for all ieY,W^ and the term 
within the brackets reduces to Thus, the marginal cost of producing 
output k is : 
5 
Sqr 
= - Y âi2L 
1 aq. " 
Q.E.D. (A.9) 
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Proof 2 
This proof is intended to relate for an input k to 
the marginal value product of the input. 
A change in total revenue is: 
= S p.* dq 
ieX 1 
(A. 10) 
where ; 
* 
p^ = p^ + s • r^ + (1-s) r^ /(1+d) for all igX^ in the case of 
a member patron, 
= p. in the case of a nomnember patron and for all ieX^. 
Setting: 
d0 = 0 
dq^ = 0 for all icY and igW^ except i = k, 
d0 becomes : 
_ âà_ (A. 11) 
Thus : 
dq, 0^ 
ôqi. i:x % 
(A. 12) 
Dividing A.9 by A.11, the marginal revenue product of input k is: 
3q k 
= _ 
ôqi. 
à ^  
(A. 13) 
From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions: 
p.* = - Y. - 6. for all ieX 1 1 eq,. 1 (A. 14) 
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where : 
6. >0 if q. =0 
1 1 
6^ = 0 if > 0. 
Substituting A.14 into A.13, it becomes: 
30 
ieX - n 
(A. 15) 
If it is assumed that no product will come into production that is not 
already in production, either 6^ or dq^ will be equal to zero for all ieX 
and the term within the brackets reduces to Thus, the marginal 
revenue product or, in this case, the marginal value product of input k 
is ; 
= Y ^ 
Sq •1 ôq. Q.E.D. (A. 16) 
Proof 3 
This proof is intended to relate -\j(ô^/Xq^)j where keY^, to the 
marginal variation in the profits of the member patrons arising from 
a change in the quantity of output k produced by the cooperative and 
sold to patrons. 
The total differential of the cooperative's production function 
$ is: 
d* = Z dq + Z Z dq. .. 
ieC,G,z ^"^i iev,w^ jeG,Y^,z 
(A. 17) 
A change in the total profits of the member patrons is : 
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+ E âlL 
ieV jeG,Y^,z d^ij iew^ jeG,Y,z 
(A.18) 
Setting: 
d$ = 0 
dq^j = 0 for all jeG,Z 
and limiting dq^ for ieC, i#k, to the change in the quantity used 
directly or indirectly in producing k, the marginal variation in the 
profits of the member patrons arising from a change in the quantity of 
output k produced by the cooperative and sold to patrons is: 
ôa 
dq.. 
' i:c ''3 -15:' Iî;, -ij 
i?^k 
+ S 
iew^ jeY^ ^2i dSij. 
(A. 19) 
d<p becomes: 
i : c % ' u v , w  " " •  
i#k = 
Thus : 
dq, 3* S dq + S ^ 
ieC ^®i ^ iev,w jeY ^^-ij 
i#k ^ c 
(A.20) 
(A.21) 
Dividing A.19 by A.21, the marginal variation in the profits of the 
member patrons arising from a change in the quantity of output k 
produced by the cooperative and sold to patrons is: 
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sn _ 3$ 
ôq,. 
2 (X 
iec 
i#k 
!!o 
3 Sq. 
- i:v % ''ij 
i:c % 
irk 
i:v 
iew^ jeY^ ^9ij 
». i. % "•• + 
(A.22) 
From Kuhn-Tucker conditions 3.24 and 3.25: 
sn 
asij 
= - X a&. 
lôqij 
-6^^ for all icV; jgY^ (A.23) 
and: 
^2i -
âS_ 
lôqi- + 6j^j for all ieW^; jeY^ (A.24) 
where: 
>0 « lij = ° 
6,, = 0 if q,, > 0. 
Also, by using as an instrument instead of , Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
3.20 and 3.21 can be replaced by: 
ôa 
(A.25) 
where : 
6j > 0 if q^ = 0 
6. = 0 if q. > 0. 
J J 
Substituting A.23 through A.25 into A.22, it becomes: 
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ôIL = . 
3^1 Sqr 
je  ^^ 
i:c % 
i#k 
z 
iev,w^ 
z 
jcYc ^^1 ôq„ ' J^ij 
Z 
icV,W^ 
Z 
j:?c 
(A. 26) 
If it is assumed that no factor will come into use that is not already in 
use, either 6. or dq. will equal zero for all ieC and either 6.. or dq.. 11 1] ij 
will equal zero for all isV,W^; jgY^ and the term within the brackets 
reduces to Thus, the marginal variation in the profits of the member 
patrons arising from a change in the quantity of output k produced by 
the cooperative and sold to patrons is: 
^ = - X, . Q.E.D. (A.27) 
This proof is intended to relate X^Cô^/ôq^), where kgX, to the 
marginal variation in the profits of the member patrons arising from a 
change in the quantity of input k obtained from patrons and used in 
production by the cooperative. 
Setting: 
d$ = 0 
dq^ = 0 for all icX except i=k 
dq.. =0 for all icV, W 
1] c 
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and limiting dq^ for ie?^ to the change in the quantity not used directly 
or indirectly in production, the marginal variation in the profits of the 
member patrons arising from a change in the quantity of input k obtained 
from patrons and used in production by the cooperative is: 
ôa 
® ' i:z ^   ^ ""1-
(A. 28) 
d$ becomes : 
(A.29) 
xnus : 
dq = -
uz % ^ 
(A.30) 
Dividing A.28 by A.30, the marginal variation in the profits of the 
member patrons arising from a change in the quantity of input k obtained 
from patrons and used in. production by the cooperative is: 
r ,an ôcr. 
ML = _ ^  
Sqr 5qr 
. __0\ 
"3 Sq/ ' 
à % ' 
s 
ieG,Y, 
(A.31) 
From Kuhn-Tucker condition 3.22 and 3.23: 
^3 " "^1 °i 
iK -30 % vti .->i. / 
and: 
= - X, + 6. for all leZ 
aq^ 1 oq^^ 1 
(A.33) 
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where : 
6^ > 0 if = 0 
6. = 0 if q. > 0. 
Substituting A.25, A.32, and A.33 into A.31, it becomes: 
Z 
sn _ a* 
Z ^ dq. 
ieG,Y^,Z °^i ^ 
(A. 34) 
If it is assumed that no product will come into production that is not 
already in production, either 5^ or will equal zero for all icG,Y^,Z 
and the term within the brackets reduces to Thus, the marginal 
variation in the profits of the member patrons arising from a change in 
the quantity of input k obtained from patrons and used in production by 
the cooperative is: 
aSk - aSk 
Q.E.D. (A.35) 
Define net profits as; 
On = : - Tg - Tf (A.36) 
where represents state income tax and represents federal income 
tax. These can be written: 
T^ = t (n - T J 
S 3 f 
(A.37) 
and: 
Tf = tf(n - T^) (A.38) 
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where and represent the state and federal marginal tax rates 
respectively. 
If the state marginal rate is a constant a. times the federal rate, 
A.37 can be rewritten: 
Ts = atj(n - Tf). (A.39) 
Substituting A.38 into A.39, it becomes: 
Tg = atgH - atg^ n + at^ T^g. (A.40) 
Solving A.40 for T^, it becomes: 
a(t - t 2)n 
T = ^ . (A.41) 
(1-at/) 
Substituting A.41 into A.38, A.38 can be expressed: 
a(t, - t.^)n 
T = t [n - 1 ] . (A.42) 
^ ^ (1-at/) 
Substituting both A.41 and A.42 into A.36, net profits is equiva­
lent to: 
a(tf-l) (tr-t.^] 
n„ = [1 -1 + — 1 ^ In. (A.43) 
^ (1-atf ) 
This can be rewritten: 
= (1 - t)n (A.44) 
